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Abstract
Cyber Threats and Healthcare Organizations: A Public Health Preparedness Perspective
Lauren E. Branch

Healthcare in the United States, heavily reliant on digital technology in service provision, has
recently seen an increase risk of cyberattacks. Coordinated electronic medical records, imaging,
pharmaceutical services, lab services and even treatment devices all rely on electronic connectivity
and represent critical services that must be secured from cyberthreats. Hospitals have become
increasingly complex systems, and this often makes the organization more vulnerable to failure.
Planning for these events is often hard for hospitals because their main charge is to provide lifesaving care to patients as they need it. This is a relatively new threat to healthcare organizations,
and there has not been limited research on this hazard and its impacts on healthcare organizations.
Therefore, the aim of the first study was to assess the trend of successful major malware
attacks on healthcare organizations in the United States between 2016 and 2017. Previous
research found limited research specific to malware attacks and found most articles covering
ransomware were restricted to news articles. A content analysis was conducted on articles from two
well-renowned health IT organizations. This study identified 49 attack cases across 27 states.
Based on previously reported statistics, the number of identified cases was low meaning healthcare
organizations are not reporting their attacks. A true risk assessment cannot be completed by the
industry until a more representative trend analysis can be completed.
The aim of the second study was to assess the organizational outcomes of a malware attack
on a healthcare organization. Previous research on this health hazard discussed healthcare’s lack
of preparedness for this new threat but did not delve in to the organization’s response, mitigation,
and recovery from attacks. Therefore, qualitative interviews were conducted with key stakeholders
from three organizations that suffered malware attacks during the years 2016-2017. Topics covered
were system impact, system recovery and business continuity, and changes to organizational
preparedness efforts. One of the main findings from this study was the realization by health
stakeholders how connected their organization, and therefore the provision of care, has become.
Participants also discussed their lack of full understanding on the potential impact these attacks
could have on their organizations before their attack, including the loss of every digital system within
their facility. A need was expressed across all facilities that more information about these attacks
need to become shared across the industry to better prepare organizations and protect patient
safety.
The final aim of the final study was to examine organizational preparedness efforts and to
identify the organizational barriers to mitigating the threats arising from cyberattacks. A survey was
conducted among healthcare emergency mangers to assess their perceptions of preparedness for
cyber threats. While the majority of respondents reported feeling either confident or very confident in
both their individual and their organizational ability to respond to a cyber attack, their responses
regarding preparedness actions their organization has taken against cyber threats were lacking.
When it comes to events like ransomware, where attack impacts are still not fully understood, the
healthcare industry remains less prepared.
In conclusion, these studies indicate a need for data related to cyberattacks to be collected in
a central repository that is either made public or shared among healthcare stakeholders. In order to
best prepare their organizations, there needs to be accurate risk assessments completed and areas
for preparedness with the best return on investment can then be identified. Cyberattacks are only
expected to increase over the next five years. Patient care is put at risk during each of these attacks
and it is essential for healthcare organizations to be better prepared for this new hazard to keep the
organization's patients, workers, and community safe.
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I. Introduction

Organizations today face a myriad of hazards they must prepare for to ensure a safe
environment for clients, employees, and to ensure business continuity. These hazards can
range from a facility threat such as fire or loss of power, to a safety threat such as an active
shooter. To better prepare for these threats and to coordinate a more efficient response,
organizations develop emergency operating procedures. Cybercrime is a new and emerging
threat that must be considered when preparing an institution’s emergency operating procedures.
One specific industry that is particularly vulnerable to cybercrime is the healthcare
industry due to their reliance on electronic health information, as well as their outdated security
systems (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Krise, 2016). Coordinated electronic medical records,
imaging, pharmaceutical services, lab services and even treatment devices all rely on electronic
connectivity and represent critical services that must be secured from cyber threats. An even
newer threat to healthcare organizations are malware attacks, where cybercriminals can encrypt
an organization’s files, essentially shutting that organization off electronically. Beginning in
2016, there has been a string of ransomware attacks on hospitals across the United States.
In May 2017, there was an outbreak of more than 75,000 ransomware attacks that
targeted at least 99 countries around the globe, which experts are calling one of the biggest
cybersecurity incidents they have seen (Larson, 2017). As part of this attack, at least 36
healthcare organizations across Great Britain were locked out of their computer systems
causing the National Health Service to cancel outpatient appointments and divert patients away
from emergency departments (Perlroth & Sanger, 2017). In December 2017, a Homeland
Security advisor said this attack and its effects directly put lives at risk (Chappell & Neuman,
2017).
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Not only does this threat put patients’ health at risk, but these attacks cost the United
States healthcare system an exorbitant amount of money. In 2015 alone, the FBI received
2,500 complaints of ransomware attacks across all industries, which cost the victims $214
million (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016). An American Public Health Association
publication cited a technology report which said in 2016 there were 1,500 cyberattacks on
health-related organizations that exposed personal information on over 155 million Americans.
This publication also noted that the cost of healthcare data breaches is highest across all
industries (Krisberg, 2017).
Very few studies have examined ransomware attacks, and how they could potentially
affect healthcare organizations. A systematic review published in 2016, found only 19 articles
published in peer-reviewed journals between 2008 and 2015 on the topic, and the majority of
these focused on data breaches of protected health information (Luna et al., 2016). It is
essential to understand the risk, mitigation, and preparedness of this threat to protect the safety
of those within and of those served by the hospital (Ayala, 2016). There is a need to catalog the
existing cyber threats hospitals face and to expand their knowledge of organizational
preparedness and mitigation of these threats.
Background
Environmental Health is tasked with making the natural or built environment a safer
place for those utilizing it (Healthy People 2020, 2017). Healthy People 2020 highlighted
disaster preparedness as an emerging issue in the field of Environmental Health (Healthy
People 2020, 2017). Within this area, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has an
Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, which is “committed to strengthening the
nation’s health security by protecting against public health threats, whether they begin at home
or abroad, or if they are natural or man-made” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2017).
2

This paper serves as a public health preparedness exploration of the new and emerging
cyber threats to healthcare organizations within the United States. Its defined environment is
that of the hospital, and the cyber threats hospitals now face is the new threat to the safety of
those within this environment.
Hospital safety
Patient safety and quality of care are two ways that hospitals are evaluated on
environmental safety. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), part of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, is tasked with producing evidence to
help improve the safety and quality of healthcare services (AHRQ, 2016). The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) use evidence put forth by AHRQ to help set quality
goals and enforces these goals with their healthcare providers (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2016). The Joint Commission is another group that works to improve patient
safety and quality of care. This is a non-profit accreditation group for hospitals, which evaluates
patient safety and quality of care before giving a hospital the ‘golden seal of approval’. This
accreditation earned by hospitals shows that the facility is committed to providing safe and high
quality care to all its patients (The Joint Commission, 2017).
Even though organizations like The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and Joint Commission work to ensure a safe environment for both patients and
employees, an emergency or disaster situation can drastically change a facility’s day-to-day
operations. Disasters often require healthcare workers to put in long hours, which puts them at
an increased risk of injury (Dembe, Erikson, Delbos, & Banks, 2005). To help ensure hospitals’
ability to both respond to hazards effectively and to continue to provide a safe environment of
care for patients and staff, there are certain regulatory requirements in place specific to
emergency management. First, The Joint Commission provides a chapter of standards specific
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to Emergency Management, which a hospital must meet to be eligible for accreditation. Under
the first requirement hospitals must conduct a hazard vulnerability assessment to see what
hazards their hospital may have to deal with. The next requirement is that the hospital must
have a written Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) that addresses communications,
resources, safety, staff, utilities, and patient care. The final requirement is that healthcare
facilities must exercise their EOP twice a year to make sure their plan is current and viable (The
Joint Commission E-dition, 2016). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has also
developed new requirements for Emergency Management in healthcare. The new standards
were released in September of 2016 and became effective on November 15, 2016. This new
ruling states that the existing regulations are insufficient in ensuring a healthcare facility will be
able to provide for their community during times of disaster (Medicare and Medicaid Programs,
2016). The community served by hospitals includes not only patients, families, and visitors, but
workers as well (Cagliuso, 2014a). The ruling focuses on three essential areas: ‘safeguarding
human resources, maintaining business continuity, and protecting physical resources. The
ruling addresses all parts of the disaster cycle: prepare, respond, mitigate, and recover.
Qualified providers much develop a new emergency preparedness program to include a
thorough risk assessment, plans and policies that address hazards identified in the risk
assessment, training and exercising of the plans and polices, and an additional communication
plan to allow for two-way communication between providers and their employees (See Figure
1). The goal of this CMS ruling is to enhance healthcare facilities’ ability to continue providing
care to their served community during times of disasters.
Cybercrime and cyberterrorism on the rise
Over the past 30 years, cybercrime and cyberterrorism have grown from potential
concern to common threat. Cyber threats became a national security issue following Y2K and
9/11 (Stohl, 2007). After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, President Bush created the Office of
4

Cyberspace Security to be managed by Richard Clarke (Weimann, 2005). In this position,
Clarke continued to raise the issue of a potential cybersecurity attack on various United States
targets (Stohl, 2007). There was also a special congressional commission created after the
attack on 9/11 to examine terrorism risks to the United States. This commission was concerned
with the potential use of a cyberattack in conjunction with a regular terrorist attack (Weimann,
2005).
Often, the terms used to define cyberattacks are used interchangeably when they have
different meanings. Denning (2000) defines Cyberterrorism as “the convergence of cyberspace
and terrorism”. This means for an act to be classified as cyberterrorism, it must have a cyber
aspect, as well as have the motivation to create fear or coercion on a government or a specific
population (Weimann, 2005). Potential targets for cyberterrorism exist among the United States
infrastructure, including the nation’s financial network, any type of traffic control including air and
train travel, electrical grids or dams, and water-treatment plants (Squitieri, 2002). There are
also fears that terrorists could use a cyberattack in concert with a traditional terrorist attack to
hinder the rescue efforts taking place (Weimann, 2005; Squitieri, 2002). There are aspects of
cyberterrorism that may make it more appealing to terrorists than traditional terror attacks. First,
cyberterrorism is conducted remotely, making it easier for the perpetrators to remain
anonymous. Second, cyberattacks are much cheaper than traditional terror attacks. Finally, the
reach and potential impact that terrorists have with cyberattacks is far greater than with
traditional terror attacks (Weimann, 2005).
Cybercrime is defined as an unlawful act in which a computer may be the tool and/or the
victim (Dashora, 2011). According to the FBI, billions of dollars are spent each year repairing
systems that have been affected by cybercrime. One of the major targets of cybercrime is data,
particularly identifiable data, including identities, bank accounts, and electronic medical records
(EMRs). In 2006, it was estimated that identity theft costs U.S. business over $50 billion with an
5

additional $5 billion in expenses to individuals (Kshetri, 2009). A study by the Ponemon Institute
saw a 19% rise in cybercrime in 2015 (Gordon, 2016). Along with the rising trend of
cybercrimes, these kinds of attacks are becoming more complex and far reaching.
One of the most notorious cyberattacks in 2016 was the hacking that took place during
the U.S. Presidential Election. Russian hackers leaked confidential emails and documents from
both the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee. It has also become apparent since the election that Russia had a hand in trying to
influence who became President of the United States (Lipton, Sanger, & Shane, 2016). In
2016, President Obama said that the United States has the potential to be more vulnerable than
other nations to cyberattacks because of the large size of the U.S. economy and because of the
high amount of digitization in this country (Kelly, 2016).
In March of 2018, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations released a joint statement regarding Russian hacking of critical United States
infrastructure (Naylor, 2018). Some targets of Russian hacking include nuclear power plants,
our electrical energy sector, and commercial facilities. The statement states the U.S.
Intelligence Community has known about Russian hackings in the U.S. since at least March of
2016. In the summer of 2016, Russia launched a ‘multi-stage intrusion campaign’ against U.S.
utilities, and an outcome of this attack was hackers gained access to at least one power plant’s
control system. In 2015, Russian hackers disrupted power to more than 200,000 people in
Ukraine when they hacked a power plant and shut down services (Naylor, 2018). A New York
Times article claims that Russia has been targeting U.S. and European critical infrastructure,
including water treatment facilities, since 2015. This same article also discusses claims from
private security firms that these coordinated attacks have been occurring since 2013 (Perlroth &
Sanger, 2018).
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One specific cybercrime is a ransomware attack, which has become much more
common against organizations (Larson, 2017). There was a 159% jump seen in ransomware
attacks from March to April of 2016. The normal increase between months had previously been
only 9-20% (Lee, 2016 May). The FBI says that in 2016, there were 2,673 victims of
ransomware attacks across the United States.
Attacks of this kind have been seen on many different types of organizations, including
government/municipalities, education, churches, law enforcement, commercial businesses, and
even the healthcare sector. During late 2017 to early 2018, three counties in North Carolina
were targeted and attacked. In December 2017, Mecklenberg County, NC was the victim of a
foreign-based hacker who gained access to the system by using a government employee’s login information. When county officials made it clear they would not pay the $23,000 ransom,
hackers made more attempts to get further in to the system (Douglas & Harrison, 2017). In
February 2018, Davidson County was attacked and all county systems, including phone
systems, were affected. This attack directly compromised the county’s 911 Emergency
Communication System (Hightower, 2018). These threats pose a direct risk to public health
emergency preparedness (Barnett, Snell, Lord, Jenkins, Terbush, & Burke, 2013).
Two major ransomware attacks, WannaCry and NotPetya, occurred within a month of
each other in the summer of 2017 and had effects seen around the globe. The WannaCry
attack took place in May 2017, and infected computers in 150 countries. This attack has since
been linked to North Korea (Nakashima, 2018). The other major attack was the NotPetya
attack, in June of 2017, which has since been linked to Russia (Nakashima, 2018). The
NotPetya virus infected computers in Denmark, India, and the United States, but most of its
victims were located in Ukraine. This virus mocked a ransomware virus while it was in fact
permanently deleting files. A few affected organizations were banks, energy companies, an
airport, and government officials. One U.S. company that was affected was the pharmaceutical
7

company, Merck. Employees were said to be sent home from all U.S. plants during this attack,
and a report on the impact of the attack said Merck revenue went down $135 million due to lost
sales (Davis, 2017).
According to a 2016 Justice Department Report, on average in 2016 there were up to
4,000 ransomware attack attempts a day. This was a 300% increase from the average number
of daily attacks seen in 2015. Ransomware is no longer a threat of a future, but rather one that
all organizations must take seriously.
Hospitals role during disasters
According to the American Hospital Association (AHA), there were 5,534 registered
hospitals in the United States at the start of 2018. These hospitals serve as major medical care
providers for their communities, providing emergency services, outpatient visits, surgeries, and
births. In 2015, the AHA states 142 million individuals were treated in U.S. emergency
departments, and there were 581 million outpatient visits at U.S. hospitals in the same year
(American Hospital Association, 2017). The AHA touts U.S. hospitals as also being economic
anchors for their communities. They provide employment for more than 5.7 million individuals,
and purchase almost $852 billion in goods and services from other businesses (American
Hospital Association, 2017).
Hospitals also serve as a major component of the Nation’s disaster response framework
(Barnett et al., 2013). Shutting healthcare providers down via cyberattack would hinder our
Nation’s response ability to any type of disaster, natural or manmade, and could seriously impair
the ability to protect public health. In the event of an emergency, hospitals will be responsible
for handling a patient surge and for providing care to any and all that need it (Barbera, Yates, &
Macintyre, 2009; Sauer, McCarthy, Knebel, & Brewster, 2009). As part of the National
Response Framework, there were 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) identified for
8

disaster response. These ESFs provide a structure for the Federal response to any emergency.
Each of these functions provides support, services, and resources for the specific need during a
response. Healthcare services during disaster response falls into ESF-8, Public Health and
Medical Services, and the services that fall under ESF-8 include medical care personnel,
medical equipment, hospital care, and outpatient care (Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, 2015).
Prior to 9/11, hospitals’ main emergency management concern were both physical
threats to the facility itself, such as a flood or tornado, and the patient surge caused during a
community emergency (Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 2009). After 9/11, the way our country
viewed emergency preparedness changed drastically. President George W. Bush created the
Department of Homeland Security to create a more coordinated effort in preparing for terrorist
attacks. To create the Department of Homeland Security, 22 Federal agencies and
departments were pulled under the DHS umbrella. After the creation of the DHS, the President
issued different Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) to better define policies
related to national security. Many of these directives were related to preparedness within the
health care system. HSPD-8, issued in 2003, clearly defines hospitals as emergency response
providers (Sauer et al., 2009). This means that hospitals must provide for the medical needs of
the community during a disaster. In 2004, HSPD-10 was issued in response to bioterrorism
fears. This directive says that hospitals must be prepared for all hazards, including explosives
and bioterrorist attacks.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) also plays a large role in
emergency response for public health and medical care. Specific to hospitals is the Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP), which was created under DHHS in 2002 to prepare hospitals for
bioterrorism and pandemic flu (Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, 2009). This program was
originally administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) branch of
9

DHHS. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPA) was passed to help our nation better prepare for and be better at responding to
disasters (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017). With the
passing of the PAHPA in 2006, Congress created the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and directed the HPP to be shifted from HRSA to ASPR.
Currently, the HPP is still run through ASPR to provide funding for hospital emergency
preparedness efforts. This funding program is a way to ensure hospitals meet certain response
capabilities defined by the federal government (Sauer et al., 2009). The goal of the HPP is to
improve community response coordination and to strengthen healthcare resources and tools
available for medical emergency response.
The Joint Commission requires hospitals to conduct a risk assessment of their facility
once per year (Marx & Slonim, 2003). This risk assessment will prioritize certain threats to the
facility, and show what areas the hospital needs to focus on with their preparedness efforts.
Hospitals have become increasingly complex systems, and this complexity often makes the
organization more vulnerable to failures and attacks (Morton, 2011). Low probability high
impact events normally occur without much warning. Planning for these types of events is often
hard for hospitals because their main charge is to provide life-saving care to patients as they
need it. Hospitals are generally more concerned with high probability low impact events, such
as medical errors and patient safety, rather than cyberattacks.
One hospital tool that is critical to help manage patient surge during disasters is the
electronic medical record. Not only do hospital staff need quick access to patient records as the
patient is admitted for care, but electronic medical records also provide a way to track disaster
patients throughout the emergency. The different cyber risks healthcare providers now face
threaten to diminish their ability to provide critical care during times of emergency.
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Cyber terror: Is the US healthcare system safe?
Amid growing threats of cyberattacks in the United States, it is important for hospitals to
be better prepared to prevent a successful attack. Some of the cyber threats facing the
healthcare industry include data breaches and malware viruses. With the shift to electronic
medical records (EMRs), cybersecurity within healthcare first began as an important issue
regarding Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance (Perakslis,
2014). HIPAA requires safeguards be put in place to ensure privacy and protection of sensitive
information (Luna et al., 2016). Another important piece of legislation regarding privacy and
EMRs is the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act.
This Act increased funding for health information technology to further “meaningful use” through
technology like EMRs, which was a term created by CMS. The goal of “meaningful use” was to
improve quality, safety, and efficiency of care, to reduce disparities, and to improve coordination
of care by allowing patient care information to have a central storage where all providers could
access data and care history (See Figure 2). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
developed the EHR Incentive Program which offered payments as an incentive for providers to
both purchase EHRs and to demonstrate “meaningful use” with patient care. The goal of the
incentive was improvement of population health. The EMR Incentive Program increased the
use of certified health IT, and in 2016 around 96% of hospitals across the country were using
EMRs (Figure 3). This increased use brings about a larger need for privacy protection (Barnett
et al., 2013; Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017).
Although data privacy is a priority for healthcare providers, breaches in patient
information still occur. According to Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) breach
database, in October 2015, over 163,000 individual health records were breached. The Office
of Civil Rights within DHHS claims that over 113 million medical records were breached in 2015.
A recent study published in The Journal of the American Medical Associated performed a
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content analysis on breach data from the DHHS database between the years 2010 and 2017
(McCoy and Perlis, 2018). The study found that healthcare providers have seen an increase in
data breaches since the passing of the HITECH Act in 2009 (See Figure 4). In 2017, healthcare
providers reported 37.2 million cumulative records being breached. There are different causes
of data breaches, including theft, loss, improper disposal, and hacking/IT incident. The authors
of the JAMA study separated the data out by breach type (See Figure 5). Breaches due to
hacking/IT incidents have steadily increased since 2010 but saw a spike since 2015. The
number of breaches due to hacking or IT incident almost doubled between 2015 and 2016. In
2017, data breach by hacking/IT incident because the number one breach type in healthcare.
Threats like malware and ransomware are relatively new to the healthcare industry. A
systematic review published in 2017 showed that the healthcare industry is less prepared for
cyber security issues than other industries (Kruse et al., 2017). With regard to cyber threats,
hospitals take precautions with data privacy, including training all staff on HIPAA policy,
because they are cautious of repercussions to any violations. But when it comes to events like
ransomware, where attacks used to be considered rare, the organization as a whole is less
prepared. There has been a more recent push for hospitals by groups like Joint Commission to
prepare for low probability high impact events, events that are less likely to happen but could
have a larger impact on the organization.
During ransomware attacks, hackers will use malware to lock the computers within a
network and demand a ransom payment for the decryption code. These kinds of attacks
essentially shut down the hospital’s ability to operate electronically and can potentially affect
patient care. The major global attack in May of 2017 that locked 36 health organizations out of
their systems in Great Britain was said to have a directly put patients’ lives at risk (Chappell &
Neuman, 2017).
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Due to their inherent nature, hospitals make perfect targets for ransomware attacks.
They depend on up to date patient records and health data to provide critical care to their
patients. Approximately 95% of hospitals use health information technology, including electronic
medical records (Luna et al., 2016). These electronic records hold essential information, such
as medication needs and patient care directives, and may be needed at a moment’s notice.
Malware attacks would lock out access to these records and put patient safety at risk.
This type of attack is a new cyber-threat for hospitals, and therefore many organizations
have out of date cybersecurity systems and have not trained staff on security awareness. Many
hospitals focus on training staff to be HIPAA compliant because of the data privacy pressures,
and fail to train them on how to keep the organization’s system safe as a whole (Zetter, 2016).
One of the main routes of entry for malware viruses are through phishing attacks. These
attacks will send an email to members of the organization with a malicious link or attachment,
and once an individual clicks on the link or opens the attachment the virus has a way in to the
network.
Another factor that makes hospitals a perfect target for ransomware attacks is their
status as a business. Over time hospitals have evolved from providing a social service for their
local communities to becoming a business tasked with making a profit (Barbera et al., 2009,
Cagliuso, 2014a). If a ransomware attack shuts down the hospital’s ability to care for patients,
the hackers are also stopping the hospital from making their profit. Making a small ransom
payment might be seen as the most beneficial solution to hospital executives, so that hospital
staff can get back to work and continue to see patients.
Timeline of hospital attacks
An outbreak of ransomware attacks on hospitals began in February of 2016 at the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California. The hospital was negatively
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impacted for days and eventually decided to pay the ransom. After their computers were offline
for over a week, the ransom payment was made for approximately $17,000 and the hospital
regained access to its systems. Since this initial attack in the healthcare field, there has been a
large increase in reported ransomware attacks across hospitals in the United States.
These attacks within the United States were not the only ones seen on healthcare
organizations since 2016. There were also ransomware attacks seen on hospitals in Canada
and Great Britain (Chappell & Neuman, 2017, Lee, 2016 Mar; Chung, 2016). There are
different reports on how often this is occurring to healthcare organizations, but there has not
been a report created on successful attacks. The risk reports that do exist also don’t expound
on the nature and scope of these attacks. Some of these attacks are affecting just a few
computers within organizations, while other attacks are significantly impacting the organization’s
ability to provide patient care. Due to the initial payment of the Los Angeles Hospital and the
inherent nature of hospitals, these types of attacks are only believed to continue to grow in
frequency.
Gaps in Literature
Cybersecurity has been a research topic of concern for quite some time (Stohl, 2007;
Weimann, 2005). However, this topic was discussed more as a potential concern that should be
considered when developing threat preparedness plans (Squitieri, 2002). It wasn’t until more
recently, when these concerns started coming to fruition, that there was an increase in the
healthcare literature (Dashora, 2011). The JAMA Article discussed above summarized data
breaches using the DHHS data portal including breaches by hacking, however the data lacks
any other type of cyber threats facing healthcare and is limited to a data breach as the outcome.
A search of the literature found two systematic reviews published on this topic since
2016, both completed by Texas State University (Kruse et al., 2017; Luna et al., 2016). The first
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review found 19 articles related to this topic of cybersecurity and healthcare (Luna et al., 2016).
This review identified threat types, discussed in the literature, including data breaches, internal
and external threats, cyber-squatting, and cyberterrorism. The reviewers noted that data
breaches were the most common cyber threat to healthcare. Only one of their 19 identified
articles discussed Denial of Service attacks on healthcare, but there was no mention of
ransomware in this review. The second review focused more on the modern threats healthcare
faces in cybersecurity (Kruse et al., 2017). The review included ‘ransomware’ as a search
criterion, which was not included in the first systematic review. This search returned 31 articles
that were analyzed. One of the themes the authors saw in their article review was that cyber
threats to healthcare organizations are growing, and there is a systematic lack of preparedness
seen across this industry sector. One of the limitations of this review the authors noted was
many of the articles returned were from news sources and not from peer-review publications.
They attribute this to ransomware being such a new threat to healthcare organizations.
Another topic covered in the literature is information technology (IT) solutions to
cybersecurity issues. This literature lives in the IT world, using IT language to span the vast
array of cybersecurity threats. The articles discuss potential end points or ways in to a system,
as well as potential solutions or patches to stop anyone getting in to a system. One research
article pointed out that much of the literature covers IT’s role during cyber emergencies, and
how IT departments are tasked with getting systems back up and running after an attack
(Barnett et al., 2013).
From a public health and a threat preparedness perspective, the literature identifies
cyber threats as a problem for the healthcare industry, but the research does not delve much
deeper in to the topic. One article which links cyber threats directly to public health states the
exact effects on public health, as well as potential mitigation strategies against this type of threat
is lacking from the literature (Barnett et al., 2013). This research project hopes to better define
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the threat of ransomware against healthcare, to identify some best practices of organizations
that have faced attacks and to identify barriers to cyber-preparedness within healthcare
organizations. A more robust understanding of cyber threats against hospitals is needed to help
identify areas for preparedness action and would ultimately make it possible to improve
cybersecurity preparedness in the healthcare industry. A hospital environment that is more
secure against cyber threats is a safer environment for patients, workers, and the community at
large.

Purpose of the Research
This study is meant to serve as a descriptive, exploratory study of a new and emerging
threat to healthcare organizations in this country. The objective of this project is to assess
trends in malware attacks against healthcare, to examine organizational best practices to
mitigate the effects of and to re-establish business continuity after a malware attack, and to
expand their knowledge of organizational preparedness and mitigation of these threats. To
achieve the study objective, I will pursue the following three specific aims.

Specific Aim 1:
To assess the trend of successful major malware attacks on healthcare organizations in the
United States between 2016 and 2017. A content analysis will be conducted on web articles
related to malware and hospitals to create a summary of successful and publicly reported
attacks beginning with the 2016 outbreak. A logic diagram will be created through identifying
technological assets within a hospital that are vulnerable to cyberattack and could, if
compromised during such an attack, jeopardized patient safety through interviews with key
informants.
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Specific Aim 2:
To assess the organizational outcomes of a malware attack on a healthcare organization.
Interviews will be conducted with key stakeholders in healthcare cybersecurity to compare
outcomes from three facilities that were victims of malware attacks. Interview subjects included
representatives from healthcare IT, emergency management, and administration. Key
evaluation questions for interviews will be identified based on existing literature and
conversations with subject matter experts to assess the impact of a successful malware attack
on a healthcare organization.

Specific Aim 3:
To examine organizational preparedness efforts and to identify the organizational barriers to
mitigating the threats arising from cyberattacks. A survey will be conducted on safety,
emergency management, and information technology staff from a healthcare organization on
their perceptions and knowledge of their organization’s preparedness for cyber threats. The
survey will be created based on existing literature and interviews with key stakeholders to
assess the barriers to an organization’s readiness for cyber threats.

This research is significant because it will expand on the knowledge of cyberattacks
against healthcare organizations, as well as provide novel data on ransomware attacks within
the healthcare industry. Completion of this research will provide an understanding of cyber
vulnerabilities within a hospital and identify what happens to hospitals during malware attacks.
The results will also preparedness actions hospitals are taking and highlight barriers to
becoming more prepared for these threats.
The novel data provided by this research project will allow hospital’s to be more informed
when making organizational decisions on emergency preparedness and mitigation. First,
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having more detailed information regarding a specific threat category against the healthcare
industry will allow for a more accurate representation of cyber threats within the organizational
hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA). The HVA is required by The Joint Commission and
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to ensure a hospital’s ability to continue serving
their community (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018; The Joint Commission Edition, 2016). A well-informed assessment is the foundation for good preparedness efforts and
the key to a successful response. Second, CMS and The Joint Commission also require
healthcare organizations to review and update their emergency plans annually to ensure
continuity of operations and provision of patient care. The CMS Emergency Preparedness Rule
even requires an emergency plan to cover interruptions to communications, including from
cyber attack (CMS, 2018). In order to effectively meet these requirements from regulatory
agencies and be prepared to ensure continuity of operations during an incident, healthcare
needs to have a better understanding of the risk these threats pose to their operations and
provision of care. Hospitals and healthcare providers serve as a building block in our Nation’s
disaster response framework (Barnett et al., 2013). If there is an emergency or disaster in our
country, hospitals are tasked with providing care to all that need it (Barbera et al., 2009; Sauer
et al., 2009). The healthcare industry is facing this new threat they need a more comprehensive
understanding of to prepare their organizations and to ensure they can remain a cornerstone in
our country’s response network.
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Figure 1: CMS emergency preparedness requirements for qualified providers

Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2018). Emergency Preparedness Rule.
Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-andCertification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Emergency-Prep-Rule.html
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Figure 2: CMS Electronic Health Record Incentive Program

Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2010). Medicare & Medicaid EHR
Incentive Program: Meaningful use stage 1 requirements overview. Retrieved from
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Figure 3: United States hospitals using certified health IT, 2016

Source: Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 'Hospitals
Participating in the CMS EHR Incentive Programs,' Health IT Quick-Stat #45.
dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Hospitals-EHR-Incentive-Programs.php. August
2017
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Figure 4: Health Breach Summary, 2010-2017

Source: McCoy, T.H. Jr., Perlis, R.H. (2018). Temporal trends and characteristics of reportable
health data breaches, 2010-2017. JAMA, 320(12), 1282-1284.
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Figure 5: Health breach data by breach type, 2010-2017

Source: McCoy, T.H. Jr., Perlis, R.H. (2018). Temporal trends and characteristics of reportable
health data breaches, 2010-2017. JAMA, 320(12), 1282-1284.
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Abstract
Introduction: The healthcare industry has begun seeing a new hazard develop against them- the
threat of cyberattack. Beginning in 2016, healthcare organizations in the United States have
been targeted for malware attacks, a specific type of cyberattack. During malware incidents
hackers can lock users out of their own network to gain access to information or to hold the
organization for ransom. With the increase in medical technology and the need for access to
this information to provide critical care, this type of incident has the potential to put patient lives
and safety at risk.
Methods: A content analysis was conducted to assess the trend of attacks on healthcare
organizations. U.S. Healthcare IT News and Becker’s Hospital Review were used to collect all
publicly reported malware attacks against U.S. healthcare organizations between 2016 and
2017. A logic diagram was also developed to illustrate how hackers gain access to a healthcare
network using malware.
Results: There were 49 cases of malware attacks against U.S. HCOs identified. The attacks
occurred across 27 states, and they took place during 18 out of 24 months. Six of the
organizations reported paying ransom, whereas 43 organizations did not pay or did not report
payment to the press. Impacts of these attacks range from network downtime to patient and
staff records being breached.
Discussion: Malware attacks have the potential to impact care delivery as well as the healthcare
facility itself. Even though this study identified 49 malware attacks, we know this number is
significantly higher based on data from HIMSS and the FBI. A reporting loophole exists in that
hospitals are only required to report attacks in the case of breached protected health or financial
data. For HCOs to fully understand the risk cyber threats pose, it is important for attacks to
become public information and for lessons learned to be shared. Future research reviewing
identified attacks could help identify best practices for the healthcare industry to better prepare
for cyberattacks.
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Introduction
Recently the healthcare industry has been facing a new type of hazard; bad actors have
started targeting hospitals and other healthcare facilities for cyberattacks.

This industry is

particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because healthcare providers depend on up to date
information from electronic health data. This information includes patient histories and test results
which is often needed at a moment’s notice to provide critical patient care. Approximately 95%
of hospitals in the United States use health information technology, such as electronic medical
records (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016). Many other health technologies including
glucose meters, IV pumps, and implanted medical devices are also connected to and dependent
on the hospital’s network. With patient safety on the line, hospitals may be more willing to pay for
restored access to their network. Healthcare organizations (HCOs) have become much more
reliant on health information technology over the past decade. Another vulnerability that makes
hospitals susceptible to cyberattacks are the out of date cybersecurity systems at many facilities
and limited training for staff on safe cyber practices (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone,
2017). These characteristics combined make HCOs good targets for attack (Luna et al., 2016;
Waddell, 2016).
The cyber threats HCOs now face are complex and can come both internally and
externally to the network (Narayana Samy, Ahmad, & Ismail, 2010). In a survey conducted by
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) of healthcare
organizations, 37.6% of respondents said their most recent security incident was caused by an
online scam artist, whereas 20.8% reported a negligent insider and 20.1% reported a hacker as
the cause (HIMSS North America, 2018). There are also many points of entry in to a healthcare
network which have the potential to make them extremely vulnerable (See Figures 1 and 2). A
point of entry is a way for bad actors to gain access to a hospital computer or network in order
to achieve something malicious, whether that be stealing data or delivering a payload virus
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(Ayala, 2016). Some points of entry identified in the HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey include
email, infected hardware or software, compromised medical devices, third party website, and a
provider or a service linked to the network via the cloud (HIMSS North America, 2018). Some
additional points of entry include internet access, a wireless network, removable media (i.e.
USB drive, laptop), or theft of equipment (Ayala, 2016). Another way hackers attack is through
backdoors or unpatched vulnerabilities, which are essentially access points left open across the
network.
Figure 1 displays a sample hardware network of an HCO. Each switch on the diagram
represents multiple devices connected to the network, and each device presents their own
multiple points of entry via e-mail, the internet, or USB connections. Once an infected phone is
connected to a computer or an infected link from an email is clicked, a virus can be transferred
to the network and spread. Figure 2 shows an example of a software network within an HCO. In
this example, there is a virtual interface with a corporate office with its own clinical and
administrative management software. There are also interfaces with many different applications
used around the organization, including imaging, labs, pharmacy, payroll, and patient
scheduling. Each of the applications represents potential points of entry for bad actors to break
in to the organization. HCOs must rely on their corporate interfaces as well as third party
vendors to keep their products secure with up-to-date protections. With so many different points
of entry in to the HCO hardware network, these networks have become extremely intricate and
therefore highly susceptible to unauthorized access. This complexity also serves to make the
network’s hard to secure.
Hackers use different attack techniques to take advantage of HCO vulnerabilities and
gain access to the network. A common type of attack is a phishing scam conducted over email.
Hackers send an authentic looking email to hospital staff and include a link or attachment that
unsuspecting users open or click. Once that content is activated, the hacker gains access to
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the network and can get information or activate a malicious virus (Ayala, 2016). Phishing scams
are on the rise; there was a 789% increase in phishing e-mails from the last quarter in 2015 to
the first quarter in 2016 (Becker’s Hospital Review, 2016 Jun). A second type of attack is a
malware attack, which is when malicious code or virus is dispatched within a computer network
(Narayana Samy et al., 2010). One example of malware attack that is of growing concern for
healthcare organizations is ransomware. In the HIMSS 2018 Cybersecurity Survey,
respondents ranked perceived threats and ransomware is now second on the list (11.3%),
whereas natural hazard (i.e. fire or flood) was eleventh on the list (8.3%) (HIMSS North
America, 2018).
During a ransomware attack, bad actors will lock users out of a network and demand a
ransom payment for the decryption key. The first ransomware attack took place in 1989 when
an AIDS researcher, Joseph Popp, sent 20,000 floppy disks to AIDS researchers in 90
countries. The floppy disks were said to contain a questionnaire to help determine patient’s risk
of contracting AIDS. When inserted, these disks infected the computer with a virus that lay
dormant until the 90th time they were turned on. Once the computer was booted for the 90 th
time, a note would appear on the screen asking for licensing fees to be paid while locking the
user out of the computer (Waddell, 2016). Since 1989, ransomware attacks have continued and
are now categorized as one of two types: scareware and crypto ransomware. Scareware will
inform a computer user there is something fatally wrong with their machine and offer a solution
for a small payment. Crypto ransomware is much more complex, in that it will encrypt computer
files so that they need a certain decryption key to be opened. These crypto-viruses have
become a lot harder, and many times impossible, to break even by experts (Waddell, 2016).
Similar to the first ransomware attack, hackers have again shifted their targets to the
healthcare industry. In healthcare, this type of attack can essentially shut down an
organization’s ability to operate and provide patient care (Siwicki, 2017b). In May 2017, a global
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ransomware attack known as WannaCry was perpetrated by the North Korean government
(Nakashima, 2018). Hackers utilized a stolen National Security Agency (NSA) tool to gain
access to 300,000 computers across 150 countries (Chappell & Neuman, 2017; Nakashima,
2018). During this attack, 36 health organizations, including hospitals, ambulance services,
and physicians’ offices, in Great Britain were locked out of their systems (Perlroth & Sanger,
2017). WannaCry forced the National Health Service to send patients away from certain
facilities in order to receive the care they needed (Perlroth & Sanger, 2017). Homeland Security
experts have said this attack directly put patients’ lives at risk (Chappell & Neuman, 2017).
This type of cyberattack against organizations has become more frequent in occurrence
(Larson, 2017). In April 2016, there was a 159% jump seen in ransomware attacks from the
month before. This was a huge rise from the normal 9-20% monthly increase that had
previously been seen (Lee, May 2016). In 2015, across all industries, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) reportedly received more than 2,500 ransomware complaints, which cost the
victims $214 million (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016). A 2016 IT report stated
93% of phishing emails now contained ransomware (Becker’s Hospital Review, 2016 Jun). In
2018, the city of Atlanta fell victim to a ransomware attack and lost many of its critical municipal
systems. This attack alone cost the city $2.7 million to recover (Spitzer, 2018).
In February 2016, an outbreak of ransomware attacks against United States hospitals
began at Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, California. The hospital was
offline for over a week before deciding to pay the ransom (Barrett, 2016). Approximately
$17,000 was paid and the hospital regained access to its operating systems (Winton, 2016).
Since this initial attack, there has been a surge in reported malware attacks of healthcare
providers across the United States. These attacks can be extremely costly for HCOs (Reed,
2016). A hospital in New York was attacked in 2017 and it has been estimated that their
recovery cost was almost $10 million, including hardware, software, extra staff hours, overtime
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hours, and loss of business costs (Davis, 2017). The on-going fixes and upgrades to the
hospital system are estimated to be an additional $250,000 to $450,000 a month (Davis, 2017).
In the most recent HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey, 75.7% of respondents reported a significant
security incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018).
The best way for hospitals to protect themselves is to be proactive and take steps to
strengthen their potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Hospitals need to conduct risk
assessments to better understand how large the risk malware attacks pose to their organization,
as well as how big an impact successful attacks can have on operations. Once they have a risk
analysis of malware attacks, HCOs can decide which fixes to their system make the most sense
financially to offer the most protection.
Lack of reliable reporting on frequencies and impact of this type of attack make it difficult
for the healthcare industry to better secure their systems. The risk reports that do exist do not
expand on the nature and scope of these successful attacks. Some of these incidents only
affect a few computer terminals, whereas other incidents have a more significant impact on the
organization and have the potential to affect patient care and safety. Due to the inherent nature
of hospitals and the initial ransom payment made by Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center,
these types of incidents are only expected to continue to grow in frequency.
A recent study assessed trends in data breach reports to DHHS Office for Civil Rights
Portal, which included data breaches caused by hacking or IT incident (McCoy and Perlis,
2018). However, this study was unable to identify which data breaches were linked to a
malware or ransomware event, and not all ransomware or malware events result in a reportable
data breach. Currently, there are popular media reports on these types of attacks, but there is
no methodology for consistently tracking hospital attacks over time. This study seeks to
address this gap by assessing the trend of malware attacks on HCOs over time. This objective
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will be achieved by reviewing publicly-reported, successful attacks on healthcare organizations
within the United States between 2016 and 2017. The final product of this analysis will be a
timeline of reported ransomware attacks on hospitals, as well as a summary of what data is
being reported with each attack. A logic diagram will also be developed to show the process of
a malware attack on an HCO. Without a better understanding of this type of threat, healthcare
organizations cannot adequately protect their organization or their patient’s safety (Narayana
Samy et al., 2010).
Methods
A content analysis was conducted of news articles related to hospital malware attacks.
The new sites Healthcare IT News and Becker’s Hospital Review were used as data sources.
Healthcare IT News is a site published by Healthcare Information and Management Systems
Society (HIMSS), and is one of the most comprehensive news sources for information on
healthcare information technology. Becker’s Hospital Review is another well-known and
reputable source of information related to information technology in the field of healthcare. A
search of these databases was conducted using a combination of the keywords “hospital” or
“healthcare”, “malware” or “ransomware” and “attack”. These articles were reviewed for
relevance to the research question. Inclusion criteria for articles were references to malware or
ransomware attacks on hospitals or healthcare facilities within the United States during 2016
and 2017. Articles that discussed data breaches caused by hackers or misplaced hardware, as
well as articles that discussed phishing scams were excluded from this analysis.
The included articles were analyzed to identify cases, which were then were formatted
into timelines to summarize the number and locations of reported malware attacks. Upon
further investigation and research, each case was also reviewed for date of attack, name of
facility or organization, location, how many facilities were affected, what the impact on the
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facility was, and if any outcome was disclosed. If the articles referenced a data breach, that
information was cross referenced with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Civil Rights Breach Report Database. The HITECH Act requires that all data breaches
impacting 500 or more individuals be reported in this database. This data was put in to a table
to summarize the extent of publicly-reported malware attacks on United States hospitals
between 2016 and 2017, and to identify trends within this dataset.
A logic diagram was also created to illustrate a malware attack on a hospital network
through a phishing attempt. This diagram walks through the steps of a phishing ransomware
attack in which a hacker gains access to the network. The diagram was created using data
collected during qualitative interviews with subject matter experts, including a Chief Information
Officer, a Chief Information Security Officer, a Senior Network Administrator, and a Healthcare
IT Manager. It uses a hypothetical hospital to show the extent of a successful phishing attack,
and the breadth of access to data and applications a hacker could potentially gain in to a secure
network.
Results
Malware Attacks, United States 2016-2017
Overall this study discovered 49 reported cases of malware attacks on U.S. Healthcare
Organizations during 2016 and 2017. Within the found instances, there were 22 malware
attacks in 2016 and 27 malware attacks in 2017. Figures 3 and 4 present these healthcare
attack cases, respectively.

This analysis has shown attacks occur all over the country and

take place all year long. The data collected showed there were malware attacks on HCOs in 13
states in 2016 and 20 states in 2017. A map of the United States displaying frequency of
malware attacks for both years is shown in Figure 5. The state with the most attacks in this
content analysis was California with 9 attacks across both years. There were 10 additional
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states that reported more than one attack and 16 states that experienced at least one attack
across both years. Both years had attacks reported in 9 different months. The identified attacks
are affecting more than just hospitals across the country. One attack against a health system
impacted 10 hospitals and 250 outpatient clinics in the D.C./Maryland region. Another attack
against a health system saw impacted hospitals across state lines. Some of the attacks only
impacted one facility, but often that facility lost access to its medical record.
Each of the 49 identified cases did not have the same impact to their respective
healthcare organization. Tables 1 through 4 present impact details of the identified malware
attacks. Forty-one of the cases were labeled as ‘ransomware’ attacks (shown in Table 1). The
articles reported that at least six organizations paid ransom (shown in Table 2). In one case
(Kansas Heart Hospital), the hospital paid ransom and the hackers released only a portion of
their files before demanding a second ransom. They did not pay the second ransom demand
(Siwicki, 2016). The other 43 cases did not disclose a payment to the press. Some of the
articles reported outage times for the organizations, which ranged from 1 day to about 2 weeks
(show in Table 3). The most frequent time offline that was reported was one week. The first
ransomware attack against a hospital, Hollywood Presbyterian, paid $17,000 after a stand-off
with hackers and almost two weeks offline. Another major impact identified was compromised
patient or staff records. Sixteen of the attacks reported no records breached. Seventeen of the
attacks reported less than 50,000 records impacted. The highest number of records reported
500,000 breached records, with three other attacks reporting more than 200,000 breached
records (shown in Table 4).
One of the issues identified while completing this content analysis was the lack of
consistency in reporting and defining this type of attack. Across all identified cases, there were
different search terms required to identify certain cases. Table 5 shows the different terms that
were required to find different cases. Ten of the cases only showed up in searches using the
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term “cyberattack”, eight only showed up using the term “malware”, and ten only showed up
using the term “ransomware”. The other 21 cases were identified using more than one of the
listed search terms. This lack in consistent reference words make it difficult to fully identify all
reported cases.
Logic Diagram
Due to the complexity of healthcare organizations, there are a few steps hackers must
go through to gain access. Figure 6 presents the steps as they would occur in an email
phishing attack. The attack begins when a hacker sends mass emails to employees within an
organization attempting to get one employee to be deceived. The email would either contain a
malicious link or attachment within that would allow the hacker to gain shell credentials to the
organization. With these shell credentials, depending upon the level of access they have, the
hacker can gain direct access to network applications or they can find another user credential
who does have access.
Once the hacker gains administrative or domain level access, they can permeate across
the organization’s network to find the information they are looking for. In this scenario, Figure 6
shows the applications and confidential data the hacker would gain access to in this HCO. The
software applications include: timekeeping, imaging, medical scribing, catheter laboratory
services, obstetrics and gynecology clinical services, the network email exchange and all
organizational file shares. From this access, the hacker has access to protected health
information, proprietary business data, payroll information, and other confidential data, such as
social security numbers of patients and staff members.
If the hacker’s goal is to deliver a malicious payload, such as ransomware, the hacker
can choose where to drop it once they gain access to the active directory enabled applications.
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They can choose a location which would cause the biggest service disruption to increase
likelihood the organization will pay the ransom demand.
Once a hacker gains access to the HCO’s network, the HCO itself has limited options on
how to stop access. The first step is that the HCO must realize they have someone with
malicious intent inside their network. Often in the case of ransomware attacks this does not
happen until applications stop working or a ransom note appears on desktops across the
organization. In cases like this, it is imperative the HCO shuts everything on the network down
to stop the spread of the virus and to cut off the hacker’s access to the network. This step
would also cut off all users’ access to the network and cause a complete organization-wide
downtime. Once the network is shutdown, the HCO can conduct impact assessments to see
how much damage has been done, if any, and can begin their recovery and business continuity
processes. If the HCO decides not to shut down the network, the hacker has continued access
to the network and the virus can continue to spread infecting more hard-drives.
Discussion
Over the last few years we have seen an increase in this trend of cyber targeting
healthcare organizations. This content analysis found 49 instances of malware attack on U.S.
healthcare organizations during the years 2016 and 2017. These attacks occurred across the
county; with 27 states having a reported attack during the same period. The attacks also impact
all areas of healthcare delivery, including hospitals, primary care, outpatient clinics, medical
suppliers, and electronic medical record providers.
With aspects of care delivery at risk, malware attacks are a threat to patient safety
(Ayala, 2016). The 49 attacks identified through this analysis had ranging levels of impact, but
all were required to go offline for a period of time to stop the spread of the computer virus.
Providing care without access to patient history can be hazardous. For example, without the
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system’s automated checks and balances in place while prescribing medications there is a
chance that something in the patient chart gets overlooked. Medical devices are also at-risk
during malware attacks, including therapeutic equipment (infusion pumps), life-support
equipment (ventilators), and diagnostic equipment (PET scanners). Any of these devices can
serve as backdoors in to healthcare networks if not secured. One report reviewed three case
studies where medical devices were used by hackers to break in and move through a network
(TrapX Labs, 2015).
Malware attacks can also affect patients and staff in ways other than through provision
of healthcare services. Attacks can have direct impacts on the facility itself, which potentially
has downstream impacts on patient care. At least one of the attacks from this analysis saw
impacts to their security systems. The hospital’s security cameras went offline, and they were
forced to go in to lockdown until the cameras could be brought back online. Another system
potentially at risk is the HVAC system. Without environmental temperature regulation, there is
the possible need for evacuation of patients. Finally, as seen in other cyberattacks, the
electrical grid and water treatment are also potential targets (Naylor, 2018). Without power or
clean water, hospitals could no longer provide care and would also be required to move
patients. Evacuation of a hospital is an extreme undertaking with regard to staffing and
resource needs as well as finding equivalent bed capacity to take patients. An extreme
example of the impact of power loss and evacuation on patient care was seen during Hurricane
Katrina at Memorial Hospital where physicians decided which patients to save and hastened the
death of others (NPR, 2013).
This is the first known content analysis to develop a list of malware attacks across the
healthcare industry. One limitation of this research is the reliance on public reports of attacks.
This analysis used two reputable healthcare IT databases to search for malware cases,
however not all attacks are being reported. Based on reports from the FBI and HIMSS, attacks
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against healthcare are occurring much more frequently than found in this analysis. The FBI
urges HCOs to report attack, but ultimately this is left up to the discretion of the facility. Attacks
are only required to be reported when medical or financial information has been compromised.
One reason for not reporting is HCOs do not want to risk their reputation or income by being
labeled a victim. This reporting loophole makes it much harder for the industry to get a clear
picture of the attack trend (Evans, 2017). Another limitation is the lack of consistency in reports
of each attack. This study tried to combat this inconsistency by using multiple search terms
including ‘malware’, ‘ransomware’, and ‘cyberattack’. With different terminology used in reports,
there are potentially cases that are being reported but might not be captured by the content
analysis. Even with this limitation, the dynamic understanding provided through this content
analysis will illustrate the frequency and types of cyberattacks as it has not been seen before in
previous research.
The sample of this analysis includes only successful attacks and no information was
collected on attack attempts. There are many more institutions who are vulnerable to attack, as
well as organizations that experience daily attack attempts (HIMSS North America, 2018).
There is a need for the healthcare industry to push for more public data regarding this hazard. If
attacks were reported to a single database, this information could be accessed in one location
and used to better educate healthcare administrators on the risk cyberattacks pose to
healthcare delivery and to business continuity. This information could also be used to better
develop a more accurate hazard vulnerability assessment (HVA) for HCOs. A well-informed
HVA is the basis for effective preparedness and response planning within emergency
management.
In 2018, this trend against the healthcare industry continues to grow. As of September
2018, there have been reported malware attacks every month of the year affecting health
systems, hospitals, third-party medical suppliers, hospice care, provider clinics, and medical
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device manufacturers. Healthcare Organizations do have a few recommended actions they can
take to protect their networks including developing a security culture within the organization. It
is recommended that HCOs teach safe-use habits to all staff and test on these rules. There are
also IT solutions to protect against cyberattacks, such as the use of strong firewalls, antivirus
software, intrusion detection, and even limiting network access (TrapX Labs, 2015). Another
avenue HCOs can explore in preparing for cyber threats is procuring cyber insurance. Costs of
attacks are estimated to be in the trillions worldwide by 2020 (Siwicki, 2017a). Cyber insurance
is a way to protect the HCO enterprise. Insurance companies will do a full assessment of an
organization’s IT capabilities and offer differing levels of coverage for a price. Often, insurance
does not cover loss of revenue from downtime during attacks (Siwicki, 2017a). As this type of
threat continues to evolve, so too will cyber insurance policies.
Cyber threats to our society are only expected to grow over time. A 2017 article from the
American Public Health Association cited a cyber-firm report which estimates over the next five
years, cyberattacks would cost the United States Healthcare system $305 billion in revenue and
these attacks would affect 1 in 13 patients (Krisberg, 2017). There is a need for future research
in this area to better define what happens within an HCO during an attack. Further review of
attack cases could highlight lessons learned and potentially lead to identification of best
practices. This research will help HCOs better understand this hazard to prepare for and plan
for mitigation of this threat. The healthcare industry has a choice to make when it comes to
emergency preparedness, are they going to prepare their organizations to prevent threats from
becoming reality to protect patient health or are they going to rely on the recovery of cyber
insurance.
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Figure 2: Software Network Diagram
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Figure 3: Timeline of Hospital Malware Attacks in the United States, 2016
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Figure 4: Timeline of Hospital Malware Attacks in the United States, 2017
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Figure 5: Frequency of Malware Attacks in the United States, 2016-2017
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Table 1: Terminology Used to Describe Attack, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017
Terminology
Malware
Ransomware

2016

2017

Total (N = 49)

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

5
17

22.73
77.27

3
24

11.11
88.89

8
41

16.33
83.67

Table 2: Ransom Payments, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017
Payment Reported
Yes
No

2016

2017

Total (N = 49)

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

5
17

22.73
77.27

1
26

3.70
96.30

6
43

12.24
87.76

Table 3: Network/System Time Offline, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017
Time Offline
1 day
>3days
>a week
1 week
2 weeks
> 2 weeks
3 weeks
5 days
Missing

2016

2017

Total (N = 14)

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

0
0
3
1
1
0
1
2
14

0
0
37.5
12.5
12.5
0
12.5
25
.

2
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
21

33.33
16.67
0
33.33
0
16.67
0
0
.

2
1
3
3
1
1
1
2
35

14.29
7.14
21.43
21.43
7.14
7.14
7.14
14.29
-
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Table 4: Number of Medical Records Impacted, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017
Impact Range
0
Less than 10,000
10,000 to 50,000
50,000 to 100,000
100,000 to 200,000
200,000 and Above
Missing

2016

2017

Total (N = 41)

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

7
4
5
0
0
0
6

43.75
25.00
31.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
-

9
5
3
2
2
4
2

36.00
20.00
12.00
8.00
8.00
16.00
-

16
9
8
2
2
4
8

39.02
21.95
19.51
4.88
4.88
9.76
-

Table 5: Search Engine Terminology, U.S. Malware Attacks 2016-2017

Search Engine
Cyber attack
Malware
Ransomware
Ransomware / More than one

2016

2017

Total (N = 49)

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency

Percentage

2
5
6
9

9.09
22.73
27.27
40.91

8
3
4
12

29.63
11.11
14.81
44.44

10
8
10
21

20.41
16.33
20.41
42.86
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Figure 6: Logic Diagram
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Abstract
Introduction: Over the past three years, the healthcare industry in the United States has become
a growing target for cyberattacks. This type of attack can take an entire hospital network offline
and has the potential to severely impact patient safety. These cases often go unreported as the
healthcare industry remains private about these incidents. Shared data on frequency and
impact occurring with these attacks could be used to identify best practices for healthcare to be
better prepare and respond more effectively to this type of threat.
Methods: A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders identified from
three hospitals that have been victims of cyberattack. Each hospital was represented by an
administrator, an information technology specialist, and an emergency manager. Content
analysis was used to identify key themes related to cyberattacks against healthcare that
emerged across multiple interviews.
Results: All of the organizations interviewed experienced complete shutdowns of their network
for varied amounts of time. Two of the three organizations had to operate within incident
command structure for over a month and did not fully recover for six months or more. Both
organizations estimated the cost of their incident to be around $10 million. Due to the length of
recovery and breadth of impact, representatives from each of the facilities felt this was the most
challenging emergency they experienced during their time in healthcare. One of the key themes
that emerged from the interviews was the potential risk these threats pose to patient care
without digital safeguards in place to ensure accurate data. The bottom line in corporate
healthcare was discussed as a barrier to being more prepared for cyber threats. The American
healthcare system has become a business where the profit margin matters and augmentations
to the system must show good return on investment.
Discussion: Participants in this study shared the malware attacks they experienced were not the
ordinary emergency healthcare organizations prepare for, and these attacks are only expected
to increase in frequency. Investments need to be made to strengthen and secure the United
States Healthcare digital environment. Organizations can educate staff to be more cyber-safe
while accessing the system, they could invest in IT security solutions, or go as far as
restructuring their network to keep critical functions walled off from the rest of the system. With
patient care and private data at risk, too much is at stake to remain vulnerable.
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Introduction
The first known ransomware attack on a United States hospital was in 2016 (Siwicki,
2017). Since this initial attack, the trend of targeting healthcare organizations (HCOs) for
malware attacks has only grown. A recent content analysis by the authors found 49 publicly
reported attacks in 2016 and 2017. Reports from authoritative organizations, such as the
Health Information Management Systems Society (HIMSS) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), claim these attacks are occurring much more frequently. In the 2018
HIMSS Cybersecurity Survey, 75.7% of respondents reported having a significant security
incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018). One reason the publicly reported
numbers are so low is because hospitals are only required to report these attacks in instances
where protected data has been breached.
Cyberattacks against healthcare can have major impacts to the organization, as well as
on patient care. One major concern hospitals have are their reputations and the potential for
loss of business during these attacks. These incidents can cause patients to feel that they
themselves or their information is not safe. Data privacy is always an important topic in the
healthcare industry and cyberattacks often put privacy at risk. Healthcare Organizations are
required to report a breach of data to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of
Civil Rights Data Breach Portal, and this report becomes public when there are more than 500
records breached (United States Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights, 2016). One issue that exists in the current system is the health organization itself
determines whether records were accessed or breached (United States Department of Health
and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2015). With their reputation and patient privacy on
the line, there is potential for organizations to make an error during the quick call to judgement
on whether records were accessed. Because hospitals often keep these incidents private, the
attacks aren’t being properly recorded or shared across the industry. Without reports, other
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HCOs aren’t aware how frequently these attacks are occurring, what happens during these
incidents or how hospitals are handling them.
Another concern for HCOs is the impact to patient care these attacks can often have.
Cyberattacks essentially shut down access to all or to parts of an Information Technology (IT)
network. At an HCO, cyberattacks can threaten patient care equipment, such as electronic
medical records (EMRs), laboratory testing technology, medication dispensing machines, active
medical devices (such as IV pumps), as well as facility maintenance equipment, such as
security cameras or HVAC systems. Without access to these tools, today’s environment of
patient care changes dramatically. In the current healthcare environment, an EMR stores all
patient data and is information within a record is relied upon to make care decisions, including
lab results, diagnosis information, and even allergy lists. During a cyberattack, data from all of
the above technologies can no longer be trusted as accurate. Each system and all of its
devices must be thoroughly inspected to make sure they have not been impacted. These
changes have the potential to put patient safety at risk through improper care delivery or
incorrect medication dosing or even through the inability to properly regulate environmental
temperatures. This potential risk to patient safety is too high for the healthcare industry to
continue keeping cyberattacks private.
Previous analysis showed that not all HCOs who fall victim to cyberattack see the same
effects on their organization. Some facilities reported minimal impact to a few of their systems,
whereas other facilities had to rebuild their entire network costing them millions of dollars. To
understand the true risk cyber threats pose to healthcare, it is important to know the full
spectrum of their potential impact. A more in-depth knowledge of previous attacks can be used
to illustrate what happens to organizations under attack as well as to identify best practices for
hospital preparedness and response.
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The primary objective of this study is to examine the organizational best practices to
mitigate the effects of and to re-establish business continuity after a malware attack. Currently,
recommended actions for HCOs are somewhat generic and lacking overall with how HCOs should
prepare for and mitigate the impacts of an attack. This study seeks to address this gap by
assessing the organizational outcomes of a malware attack on healthcare organizations. This
objective will be achieved by first identifying key evaluation questions based on existing literature
and conversations with subject matter experts. These questions will then be used to interview key
stakeholders in healthcare cybersecurity, including representatives from healthcare IT,
emergency management, and administration, to compare outcomes of three different facilities
that were each victims of a malware attack.
Methods
A series of in-depth interviews was conducted with staff from three separate healthcare
organizations to answer this aim’s research questions. This qualitative approach was chosen to
allow for a deeper understanding and help create an in-depth description of what happens
within an organization during a ransomware attack (Cagliuso, 2014a; Creswell, 2007).
Hospitals selected for this study had experienced a malware attack on their organization within
the previous 2 years, and the interview subjects were employed at the HCO during the time of
their attack.
Interviews were conducted with three representatives from each healthcare organization.
Each HCO was represented by an employee from each of the following stakeholder groups:
hospital administrators, hospital safety/emergency preparedness coordinators, and health IT
staff. By interviewing individuals from different stakeholder groups, the data will provide a wellrounded explanation of the phenomenon in question (Cagliuso, 2014a). Hospital administrators
oversee the clinical and operational aspects of the hospital, as well as serve as decision makers
in the organization’s response (Cagliuso, 2014a; Cagliuso, 2014b; Healthcare IT News &
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HIMSS Analytics, 2016). Hospital safety/emergency preparedness coordinators ensure the
organization meets the regulatory requirements for emergency preparedness. Health IT staff
ensure all IT equipment within the facility runs smoothly and securely. The participants selected
were key individuals in the response to their organization’s cyberattack. Interview subjects will
remain confidential and will only be identified by their stakeholder group.
A semi-structured interview guide was developed using background information and
research questions, including data collected from previous analysis and informal conversations
that have occurred with hospital representatives. The interview will consist of open-ended
questions with probes to help elicit information from the interviewees. Some of the topic areas
covered in these interviews are recognition of the attack, impact of the malware on their system,
an overview of their recovery efforts, preparedness efforts both before and after the attack, and
whether there have been other attacks on their organization. The interview guide can be found
in the Appendices. The interviews were conducted over a nine month period at times
convenient to the participants. Each interview was recorded and transcribed for analysis.
Once the interviews took place, the transcripts were analyzed using content analysis.
The purpose of content being analysis of documents, text, or speech to see what themes
emerge from the data (Krippendorff, 1989). The data was read all the way through prior to the
analysis being conducted. Multiple read throughs as well as techniques such as memoing and
marking were used to help identify themes across the nine interviews (Creswell, 2007). Some
key descriptions of what the stakeholders experienced are included in the paper to help
illustrate the emerging themes (Cagliuso, 2014b).
Results
This study explored the lived experiences of nine stakeholders in healthcare
cybersecurity. Interview questions 1-4 collected demographic information, while questions 5-9
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examined issue salience and situational awareness. Questions 10-19 elicited descriptions of
system impact, business recovery, and organizational preparedness. The results are displayed
in three sections: participant description of the attack and its impact on their organization, the
identified themes across interviews, and organizational actions taken to be more prepared.
Quotes from participants are included to provide individual descriptions of the experiences
discussed. The mean length of time for interview was 41 minutes.
Characteristics of the healthcare organizations are summarized in Table 1. Two of the
facilities interviewed are Level One Trauma Centers, and the other facility is an acute care
hospital. The average bed count between all three facilities is 509 beds. The first set of
questions regarded participant demographics. This data has been summarized in Table 2.
Each organization was represented by two males and one female. The average years in career
field was 11.4 years. Highest level of education completed ranged from an Associate’s Degree
to a Doctor of Medicine, with the most common level seen across participants being a Master’s
Degree.
Each healthcare organization experienced a malware attack between 2016 and 2017.
Two of the organizations’ incidents were ransomware attacks, where the hackers asked for a
ransom payment to unlock their networks. Both of these hospitals reported not making the
ransom payment. The other organization reported originally seeing a ransom note on their PCs
which quickly disappeared, and the organization realized this was a malware attack rather than
a ransomware attack. The hacker’s primary goal in this organization’s incident was system
damage.
While discussing the details of each organization’s attack, some similarities started to
become apparent. One characteristic each organization identified as helping their response and
mitigation was the quick recognition of the incident by information technology (IT) staff. Each
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organization realized they were infected with a virus when employees called their IT desk and
reported issues with accessing certain computer applications. The IT staff member at each
organization realized what was occurring and shut down their network. Hospital A expressed
how important it was for their IT staff to have the authority to make this call on their own.

A

rapid shutdown of the network can stop the lateral spread of the virus across the system and
essentially ‘stop the bleeding’ in terms of system impact. The Emergency Manager from this
facility expressed how impactful this was for their organization:
“Our IT folks…they have the autonomy…that if they noticed something that's
hanky, they don't have to pick up the phone and call somebody and get
permission to lock things up and to protect us. They have the ability that the
minute they see something that's weird, they can essentially lift the plastic, hit the
red button and let folks know after the fact that…something's up. So…that was a
saving grace for us.”
Even though each organization’s quick recognition and reaction to the attack, there were
still different lengths of impact and business recovery. The shortest impact was Hospital C
which was back to normal business in about seven or eight days. Whereas Hospital A and
Hospital B had their incident command teams activated for over a month and were not back to
normal operations for six months. These facilities were required to rebuild their entire networks
which was extremely time consuming and costly. This rebuilding of a network entails cleaning
or replacing each PC, each hard drive, and each piece of equipment on the network; meaning
for most of these facilities thousands of hard drives had to be cleaned or replaced. Both
Hospital A and Hospital B shared in their interviews that the network rebuild cost more than $10
million. This cost of impact includes equipment costs, increased hours by salaried employees,
and business interruption costs. The length of impact between hospitals differed because of
how far-reaching the virus was through their networks. Forensic investigations revealed the
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attackers had been in the organizations’ networks prior to the activation of the malware virus.
All facilities interviewed said the virus was believed to have been in the system anywhere from a
couple of hours prior to activation up to 24 hours prior to activation. Hospital A did report the
hackers had been in their system the week before the attack, most likely mapping out the
hospital network. Additional time in the system allows hackers to find the most detrimental
location within the network to deploy the malware virus. The goal in a ransomware attack is to
cripple an agency so they feel their only way out is to deliver the ransom payment.
The length of impact was defined by how far-reaching the virus was within the
healthcare system, and as a result by how many applications were affected. Two of the
hospitals saw complete shutdowns during their attacks. The Administrator from Hospital A said,
“everything was absolutely cutoff.” The Emergency Manager from Hospital B illustrated this
point a bit further,
“Every computer system in the organization was taken out with one exception of
a security computer that regulated electronic door locks and electronic badge
access to the actual main campus.”
When questioned for more details regarding applications that went down during the
attack, all interviews mentioned patient care, business, and facility management applications
were impacted. Hospitals A and B lost access to their electronic medical records (EMRs).
Hospital C did not have the virus infect their EMRs itself, however they had issues with
supporting applications to the EMR taking it offline for a period. Each facility was forced to go
back to pen and paper records for a period of time, which will be discussed more below. These
records included patient charting, medication orders, laboratory results, and radiology results.
Radiology was highlighted by all facilities as being a heavily impacted department, noted
because of how technology reliant they are. Hospital A was forced to go back to printing films
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and having a radiologist in house to read films and dictate results. All three facilities also
reported seeing impacts in the Pharmacy department. Each facility was forced to fill orders by
hand and had issues accessing their medication dispensing devices. Scheduling was another
piece of patient care that was affected at Hospitals A and B. All schedules for patient
appointments, operations, etc. are kept electronically and were not available during the attack.
One the business side of the house, there were effects seen on the revenue processes.
First, billing is done electronically and when that went down Hospital A was unable to bill out or
accept payments for almost two months. The Administrator said:
“We couldn’t pull any data…So revenue-wise it was a real problem. … We
couldn’t bill out…bills were coming in, but we couldn’t see them.”
Another revenue-impacting application that was affected was the timekeeping system at both
Hospital A and B. Hospital A was forced to go back to paper timecards to track employee
hours. Due to the attack occurring so close to pay day, they also were unsure what was owed
to each of their employees. For that billing cycle, they opted to pay employees what they were
paid on their previous paycheck and to reconcile these payments once the system was back up
and running. Another huge impact seen at all the facilities was loss of email. As pointed out by
the Administrator from Hospital B, “No email whatsoever, imagine in today’s world, no email…it
was devastating.”
Secondary systems were also lost in the attacks. The IT representative from Hospital B
explained it as,
“It was little side things that you assume will work no matter what, suddenly were
down.”
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At their facility, they were unable to take credit card payments in their cafeteria. They also had
a tube system through their facility that wasn’t functioning properly. Hospital C reported issues
seen with their sterile processing for endoscopies. Other applications were impacted simply
because the network was down, meaning they were operational but had no network to talk to
and nowhere to deliver their data. The IT representative from Hospital A illustrated this point by
saying,
“Modalities were working but only in isolation…without the network, they're
essentially deaf, dumb and blind. You had to figure out how to do everything from
the device itself.”
Finally, there were varying impacts seen to security systems and HVAC systems, which will be
discussed more in the following section.
Themes
A few key themes emerged from the participant narratives. Below is a discussion of
these themes, as well as a few key quotes from participants to help illustrate their experiences.
Theme 1: Risk, risk everywhere
One of the topics discussed in almost every interview was how common this threat has
become for the healthcare industry. The administrator from Hospital B said, “this is a constant
continuous threat to all healthcare organizations.” The Emergency Manager from Hospital C
shared how concerned he is about keeping his organization prepared against cyber threats,
“What frightens me is the sheer volume of cyberattacks that we see on a daily
basis, coming through the hospitals. That volume is alarming, and any one of
those things could get out of control and cause problems. It's a constant threat.
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…my fear is that it's going to just keep occurring and the frequency and the
expansiveness of it at a facility or facilities plural [will increase].”
Each facility acknowledged they’ve had attack attempts on their organization since their major
attack. Hospital B’s IT representative said, “We have attacks daily, but none of them have
penetrated our defenses since then.”
Representatives from all facilities also expressed concern for the ability to keep hackers
out of their systems. Multiple interviewees pointed out the race that exists between IT
professionals and hackers to build more secure walls and to break down the security measures,
respectively. The hackers look at this as a business and are constantly working to find ways to
get around security features. The threat is continuously evolving, and IT professionals must
stay aware of these almost daily changes in their field to remain secured. The Administrator for
Hospital C expressed his concern for this evolution,
“It is perpetual and just because what you did was effective yesterday or even
today has no bearing on whether or tomorrow. …So, we remain vulnerable.”

Another major concern expressed was how little is understood or shared about cyber
threats in healthcare. The stakeholders felt that having more concrete information about this
threat would provide a path forward for them. The Emergency Manager of Hospital C said,
“I don't know that there's …a true risk assessment that's been done to
understand the impact [to] operations from a malware or cyberattack.”
Another participant (IT from Hospital A) expressed similar thoughts below,
“There seems to be nobody collecting or willing to communicate exactly how
much damage is actually occurring out there.”
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The participants felt with more data, they would be better equipped to prove how large of a risk
this is and provide solutions that offer good return on investment. These stakeholders are
dissatisfied with existing solutions, as well as the secrecy and the privacy between healthcare
organizations. Currently, they feel the best way to protect their organization is to be better than
the next organization. The IT representative from Hospital A expressed his approach below,
“I don't think there's any way you can totally prevent them, but if they find it
difficult to attack you, they're going to move onto the next person. Which to me is
a sad statement to the state of healthcare security in this country because my
primary defense is make sure I'm stronger than the next person. And you know,
that doesn't make me feel good.”
If HCOs were more open about being attacked, that information could be used to more clearly
define what happens during these attacks and identify best practices for preparing
organizations. This shared belief was a major reason why these three organizations agreed to
be part of this study.
Theme 2: Realization of how connected we are in today’s healthcare delivery environment
While all participants have worked in healthcare for years, they have each seen the
healthcare industry evolve from one of paper records and orders to an almost completely digital
environment. Even with this knowledge of the digital world they live in, most stakeholders
expressed the shock that came during the attack realizing how connected their facility was and
how many processes in their field have become automated. The Administrator from Hospital C,
who is also a clinician, expressed his shock at realizing how technology dependent his
organization has become in the following two quotes.
“Frankly, I don't know that outside of IT we gave it enough due prior to that until
we realized how truly dependent we were on the tech functions that go on in the
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background. The example that I use when explaining it to other folks is, we were
unable to appropriately wash and sterilize endoscopes because of the malware
attack. You wouldn't think that you could, that somebody affecting the computer
would keep you from being able to do a colonoscopy.”

“You know, if [our Electronic Medical Record] goes down, we can't check a blood
sugar. … Because our glucometers are set up that they work after scanning a
patient ID so that they will automatically input the value into that patient's chart.
So if you can't scan the patient's ID, because [the EMR] won't receive the
function, you can't check the blood sugar.”
Another major realization that occurred during their attacks was how many different applications
were being utilized across their organization. One of the first steps of the response was
creating a list of the applications impacted and then prioritizing them on critical function. During
this process in each organization, there were applications brought up that people in the
command center had no idea what they were or who was using them. The Emergency
Manager from Hospital A shared, “I don't think any of us realized just how many separate,
different programs that we actually had.” Not only was this an issue with response, but each
application on the network poses additional security risk to the organization. The Administrator
for Hospital A shared this was a question when reloading applications, asking whether the
application was necessary and worth the additional risk. She shared that not all applications
were reloaded on to the network.
One facet of security risk brought up by the IT stakeholders was healthcare’s
dependence on third party’s security. Today’s healthcare environment uses different software
applications to conduct care delivery and business operations. Most of the applications
discussed above come from third party vendors. Once the application is purchased, it is often
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put on the hospital’s network, and if that application is not up to date with security, it can serve
as a potential route of entry in to the organization’s entire network. One of the IT stakeholders
expressed this by saying,
“I still think there's an issue in healthcare… it's one of the few environments I
can think of that it's the inside software systems, the mechanical systems and
everything are managed and created by different organizations…companies that
really don't look at security as our primary goal.”
One of the other IT participants expressed his concern on this topic saying,
“We need to gear up and check and make sure all these vendors making these
medical devices understand the full impact of their role in preventing this.”

Theme 3: What’s at stake with patient safety and environment of care
A big concern in healthcare is always data privacy, and during a cyberattack that
becomes a major concern. An unwanted party has accessed a private network and potentially
accessed any number of private records, including patient health or employee personnel.
Hospital A spent months investigating to make sure there was no Private Health Information
(PHI) was breached.
One of the first questions asked during each of these cases was ‘how does this impact
patient care?’ In each of these cases, the organizations were able to continue care for the
patients on hand. One of the facilities put their Emergency Room on diversion until they were
able to get a better handle of the situation. Another facility had to cancel some surgeries
scheduled for that day. Also, as discussed previously most of the normal digital processes for
providing care were inaccessible to providers and there had to be work arounds put in place.
Without the usual system safeguards in place and the large number of younger employees who
reported not knowing how to switch back to paper charts and orders, there becomes increased
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chance of error with provision of care. The hospitals in this study felt they could provide safe
care for most of their patients, but they were unsure whether they could rely on the patient data
they had. There was a huge concern expressed by more than one facility that health data they
had for each patient was potentially no longer reliable. They worried patient charts or test
results were compromised and realized how detrimental that could be when making care
decisions. One of the IT stakeholders expressed his thoughts on the topic,
“Also [the importance of making sure] that the integrity of the data is solid, this is
health data for patients. Doctors and physicians and clinical staff are running with
this data and providing care and that data is not solid. We can be doing really
serious harm to the patient.”
Another issue regarding patient care that was mentioned by the facilities was the use of
medical devices, such as I.V. pumps. While participants all reported no impacts seen to
medical devices at their facilities, they still had concern. A few mentioned they had read articles
about the potential for active medical devices to be impacted by cyberattacks, and how there is
proof that medical devices have been hacked before. The reason these facilities did not see
impact to their medical devices was due to the devices being off-network or due to the virus not
making it to that part of their network. One of the IT participants made this comment about his
facilities’ I.V. pumps,
“Yes, they are on my network. The models that I have, have not been associated
with any attack, but that's not to say that that won't come today, tomorrow, next
week.”
Another effect seen during these attacks which can potentially impact the patient care
environment are the facility management functions. The security systems and HVAC systems
both saw impacts across these three organizations.
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Two of the facilities reported issues with

their security systems. One facility reported their badge readers going down for a short time.
The other facility reported having issues with their security cameras. One of the participants
said this about their security cameras,
“There was concern that we were not able to view our security cameras. So
pretty much we were blind looking out into areas… [such as] entry points and
other high-risk security areas that we would normally use video cameras to
monitor.”
Ensuring a secure environment is essential to providing safe care, and without the ability to
control access to the facility or certain areas of the facility patients and staff are potentially put at
risk. Both issues were made a priority and resolved quickly.
The third facility noted the attack had an impact to their HVAC system. The organization
lost the automated controls of the system and had to monitor the environment, as well as make
any adjustments by hand. A representative from that facility discussed this effect below,
“The plant operations team actually went around and manually monitored that
during our time period. They would do… hourly or daily checks to make sure
everything was up and running and if they needed to tweak it, they did it by
hand.”
If the proper temperature cannot be maintained or ventilation becomes an issue, the facility may
have to consider evacuating patients. For these three facilities, with a combined average of
over 400 beds each, this would not be a simple task and moving certain types of patients could
cause major health complications. The other two facilities reported they did not see impacts to
their HVAC systems because one system was too old to be on the network and the other was
on its own network.
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Theme 4: This is not a normal healthcare emergency
One thing that became very apparent throughout the interviews was these malware
attacks were unlike any other emergency healthcare organizations normally face. Reasons
given in support of this statement were the length of time it took to recover, as well as the extent
of impact seen across each organization. One of the Administrators expressed this sentiment
by saying,
“This was by far the most far reaching and devastating event I've ever been
involved with in all my years of being in healthcare.”
An Emergency Manager from a different organization expressed similar sentiments saying,
“The challenge, the one thing that took the wind out of our sails was not so much
the scope of what happened but the length of what happened. We operated in
incident command mode for pretty much a month….this is not the typical disaster
that a hospital faces….But this magnitude and this duration is what sets this
apart.”

Sometimes this type of threat is compared to downtime at a healthcare facility, where a
piece of the system or applications go down. This happens often at hospitals where the IT team
sets up a scheduled downtime while they deploy a security patch or sometimes when something
goes wrong with an application. Hospitals prepare for these downtimes by pre-establishing
downtime procedures that most staff are comfortable with. This type of event though is very
different than a normal hospital downtime because during cyberattacks these facilities lost
access to everything. Each of the organizations interviewed expressed their assumption that
they would only lose one or two things at a time, and that in hindsight they realized how
unprepared they were to function without access to anything. An Administrator pointed out:
“We had a lot of assumptions that not everything would ever go down at once.”
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The Emergency Manager from another organization said,
“We were not used to losing all of it at the same time, and that's what created the
issues. We have plans for the loss of [each] thing that was impacted and we
have lost everything that was impacted at one time or another, but to have lost all
at the same time was the challenging part.”
Another issue that arose at two of the facilities based on this assumption was their downtime
procedures were stored electronically. They expected to always have some working computers
or printers but had ended up having none during their initial response. Luckily, they were able
to find ways around this by having a few paper copies or a laptop that had been completely
unconnected from the network at the time of attack.
Theme 5: Tenured staff were our heroes
An unexpected theme that emerged during the interviews was how essential tenured
staff was to the organizational response and recovery from the attack. This theme was
mentioned by at least one stakeholder from all three facilities. The participants explained that
staff who had been in healthcare longer were able to shift back to pen and paper records much
easier than newer staff. This group of individuals had experience with paper charting during
their careers. In contrast, the participants mentioned the hard time that younger staff had with
switching back to paper charts. The Emergency Manager from Hospital A expressed,
“In some cases, it was kind of humorous, a lot of the newer younger clinicians,
whether it's nurses, whether it's physicians, they are so acclimated to doing
everything in the electronic realm.”
The tenured staff were able to show the younger generations how to do things without
access to the network. All the participants who mentioned this topic were thankful they
had experienced staff there who had knowledge of paper charting. The IT stakeholder
from Hospital B shared her experience seeing this phenom happen during their attack,
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“That's where it was really interesting where some of the employees that had
worked in healthcare long before we had the electronic arena, they were able to
help many of the team members who had basically grown up with electronic
[health record]... They were able to show them, there's other ways you can do
the same thing.”
Organizational Preparedness
The final section of the interview involved questions related to organizational
preparedness. Topics covered in this portion of the interviews included barriers that
exist to being more prepared for cyber events and best practices to better preparing an
organization for cyber threats.
When asked about barriers to being more prepared, there were three main topics the
participants mentioned. The first barrier they felt exists to being more secure in healthcare is
the complexity of an IT network itself. As discussed above, health systems are made up of
applications and products that are developed by third parties. Each health system is also
different from one another. This complexity makes it hard to keep each piece of the puzzle
secured. One of the administers point out,
“There's no uniformity, and so that tremendous amount of variation in what is
used and the particular brands and the particular versions. There's such variation
that there is no one size fits all and I think that makes it much harder to be able to
prepare for this and to prevent it from happening.”
Another barrier discussed was one often seen in Healthcare Preparedness, limited funds
and limited time (Cagliuso, 2014b). There are a lot of IT solutions that could all be implemented
at a facility to make it as secure as possible, however each of these solutions comes with an
associated cost. Most healthcare organizations are not able to spend unlimited amounts of
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money on IT solutions. There also needs to be a lot of time spent to thinking of solutions and on
education of staff. One of the administrators pointed out,
“Organizations do not have the money to do everything they want to do to
prevent this from happening and to do all of the education that needs to happen
on a continual basis in order to help prevent a future.”
Often smaller healthcare facilities do not have a full-time emergency manager, but rather
add this as a supplemental duty to another job. This was a topic brought up by one of the levelone trauma centers while considering their neighboring hospitals.
Along with limited funds affecting the ability to purchase IT solutions, so too does
healthcare organizations being run as businesses. The bottom line or profit margin are
important to these organizations, and there is the need to prove wanted solutions will provide
good return on investment. This was expressed by a few different participants. While
administrators feel it is important to invest in security, they also express that return on
investment is essential. The emergency managers expressed their feelings that there is not
enough data out there to effectively illustrate the vulnerabilities in healthcare. One of them also
expressed his interest to frame the risk these cyber threats pose to revenue streams within the
organization to get more administrators on board with costly IT solutions.
“I do think we dedicate a fair portion of resources to cybersecurity….we could
probably spend substantially more. The tough part is, you know, everything when
it comes to resources is, you know, you have to make risk benefit decision.”
Hospital executives from all departments must agree the cost of what’s at stake during cyberemergencies, i.e. patient care, private data, and business reputation, are all too much of a risk
not to invest in stronger cyber-preparedness efforts.
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Responsive Actions
Due to each of these facilities experiences with cyberattack, they made investments of
both time and money to improve their security systems. One of the first things mentioned by
facilities was the general security practices, such as more frequent password changes and use
of two-factor authentication. One of the facilities went as far as not giving system access back
to many employees. They reevaluated who needs access to their network to complete their
daily assignments and only gave accounts to individuals who needed them. These
organizations have also questioned which applications are essential to their providers.
Applications that were providing duplicate functions or were not deemed essential were not
restored in the system.
Another change made by the facilities was restructuring their networks. One facility
created a tier structure for their applications. Tier zero is a level someone must be physically in
the building to gain access to and contains highly sensitive applications. Tier one contains
applications, such as the EMR and clinical data. Individuals can gain remote access to this tier
but must go through the upgraded security features listed above. This tier structure has oneway traffic, so individuals can only go down the tiers to access data but cannot travel up to
higher levels without access.
An additional investment in network security made by all three facilities was more
education and training for staff members on how to be secure. This training includes advice for
safe-cyber practices in both the professional and personal realm and is held during new staff
orientations. One hospital mentioned also conducting department specific training on cyber
security as a follow-up. All three organizations run phishing drills with their staff where a fake
phishing email is sent out with a link to see how many staff members click the link. In the cases
where staff members click on the link, some type of continued education is provided to reiterate
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to them the importance of being cautious when clicking links or opening attachments. The
organizations also made changes to their downtime procedures to resolve some of the issues
discussed above. They keep paper copies of downtime forms, and at least one of the facilities
has held a table-top drill to practice their new downtime procedures.
Finally, the participants discussed more drastic measures their organizations have taken
to be more prepared for additional cyber threats. One of the HCOs developed an IT specific
Incident Command Team. This team consist of a broad background of IT professionals who will
respond quickly to mitigate another potential attack. If there is a question of another incident
occurring, they will investigate and have the authority to immediately shut the network down if
they feel it is necessary. The other two facilities discussed their use of cyber insurance. This is
a specific type of insurance organizations can get to protect themselves if an attack does
happen. Both HCOs had their insurance prior to their attack and discussed the insurance firms
sending cyber-representatives to help with the mitigation and recovery. This is an avenue that
some HCOs may be interested in and financially able to pursue, but it should not be the only
solution for HCOs in preparing cyber threat. These healthcare attacks are only expected to
increase in frequency over the next few years and with patient safety and data is on the line,
HCOs need to invest in prevention and preparedness for their networks.
Discussion
Data collected through stakeholder interviews document the experiences of healthcare
organizations responding to and recovering from a successful malware attack. There were
similarities among the organizations’ cyberattacks but there were also many differences. Each
organization is unique in its own complex way and learning more details about attacks against
healthcare can help educate the industry on what risk the threat poses. Each facility highlighted
their information technology staff’s quick response time to reported issues and their decision to
shut everything down as essential to minimizing the viral impact on the network. While the
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malware did cause large impacts across each network, none of these cases suffered data
breaches. All three organizations agreed this incident was unlike any other healthcare
emergency they’ve handled before. A malware attack is different in both its length and breadth
of impact. The participating organizations operated in incident command for an extended time,
which is not a normal routine for healthcare facilities. A normal emergency for healthcare
usually lasts a few hours to potentially a few days; in two of the cases their recovery efforts took
months. Each organization also stated their scale with regard to downtime procedures was
incorrect. Their system and their staff were not prepared to lose everything at one time and to
be disconnected from all digital applications for an extended time. The participating facilities
acknowledgment their younger generation staff members not knowing pen and paper
procedures and highlighted a gap that is taking place within the current healthcare educational
environment. It is essential for staff to understand these procedures to ensure safe care and
curriculum in all healthcare education need to include this information. The attack made clear
how dependent on technology healthcare delivery has become.
Another topic discussed by participants was the strategy to ‘just be better’ than the next
facility within healthcare security. This approach assumes hackers are hitting certain facilities
and give up on that organization when they can’t break in to the network. The attack campaigns
are more random, and hackers send out numerous attempts to separate facilities at one time to
see where they can get through. The attackers may then make changes to their code and could
potentially send this new attempt out to the same facilities. As one of the administrators pointed
out in their interview, just because a healthcare organization’s defense worked today does not
mean it will work tomorrow. This safety strategy boils down to passing the buck and is a faulty
strategy for healthcare organizations to rely on to keep their organizations secure and their
patients safe. Passing the buck on safety often leads to bigger disasters down the road
(Barnier, 2011). It is not enough for safety programs to be the absence of bad things happening
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but must be the presence of a plan or preparedness actions in place to prevent the attack from
occurring. Through this experience, the three HCOs determined investments needed to be
made to their IT security, to their staff training and awareness, and to their preparedness and
response plans.
This study provided valuable insight in to hospitals’ experiences during malware attacks.
One limitation of this research lies in the nature of the topic itself. The healthcare industry is
very private about these attacks due to patient care concerns and business reputation concerns.
Stakeholders from each of the three facilities expressed the idea that more openness across
healthcare regarding cyber threats is essential to being a better prepared and a more secure
industry. Even with this belief, there is still the potential that the participants kept some aspects
of their organizational experience private. Federal regulations similar to CMS Emergency
Preparedness Rule or DHHS data breach reporting rule may be needed to open the industry up
and gain access to important data. A central repository for data on malware attacks against
healthcare would be vital to understanding the risk these threats pose. Until the industry is
more open with information, studies like this may not be getting the full picture of actions
healthcare organizations are taking to be prepared. Another potential limitation with this study is
the interviews were all conducted more than a year after the incident in question. This lag of
time from the organizational attack and recovery efforts to the interview could have potentially
introduced bias in to the data. One observation made while analyzing the interview transcripts
was not all the stakeholders from a facility reported the same experiences, but it was unclear
whether these differences came from recall bias or from privacy concerns related to the
incident. A few of the participants were able to pull documents from the time of the incident to
confirm facts they were stating. A final limitation with this study is the data collected during
these interviews may not be generalizable to all cyberattacks against healthcare in the United
States. There are many different types of cyberattacks, and each attack is its own unique case
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dependent on the type of attack and how far a virus permeates a network. In the previous
content analysis by the authors, it was reported that six organizations reported making a ransom
payment to end their attack. This was not always the case, but one could assume their
experiences were much different than the ones described in this study. The data collected in
this study is still vital to understanding what happens during a malware attack against a hospital
and how that hospital responded.
Cyberattacks against healthcare facilities are only expected to continue to increase in
frequency. In 2017, the healthcare industry became the most popular target for breach attempts
(Columbus, 2018). It is clear based on the previous content analysis that most of these attacks
go unreported. The participants of this study expressed the need for solid data on number of
attacks as well as on the impact being seen across the industry from cyberattacks. Because the
data is not being reported, there is not a central public database housing this information similar
to the public database for healthcare data breaches. This study provides a detailed explanation
of the impacts seen during three separate cyberattacks. Impacts could be seen with business
administration, patient care, and environmental regulation. The accuracy of patient data used to
make care decisions was a major concern for all the facilities during the attack. If this data had
not been accurate, grave errors could have been made. Another growing concern in healthcare
security is targeting of active medical devices. While none of the facilities interviewed saw
impacts to their medical devices, one of the facilities does have I.V. pumps connected to their
network that could have been infected with malware. If medical devices become infected,
hackers could change medication dosage information or hold individual patients’ lives hostage
while demanding ransom from the organization (Ayala, 2016).

There is limited research on these attacks; a 2017 literature review on the topic found
only 31 articles, most of which were news articles (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone,
2017). An article from the American Public Health Association estimates that cyberattacks will
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cost the United States Healthcare system an estimated $305 billion in revenue over the next five
years (Krisberg, 2017). As highlighted in the interviews, showing the return on investment is
essential to gaining buy-in from those at the top. As one of the administrators said, “Making it
relevant to the individual is what matters. Not making it relevant to the organization. I think like
many organizations, you have a lot of priorities that compete to be first, only one thing can be
top priority.” With patient safety and the environment of care at risk, let’s hope the top priority
has become a more secure digital healthcare environment.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Hospital Demographics
Hospital
Name
A

Type of Hospital

Level of Care

Location*

Range of Beds

Medical Center

Level One Trauma

Urbanized Area

More than 300

B

Community Hospital

Acute Care

Rural

Between 100 and 300

C

Medical Center

Level One Trauma

Urban Cluster

More than 300

*Location Classification based on United States Census Bureau: Urbanized Areas have population over
50,000 ; Urban Clusters have population between 2,500 and 50,000 ; Rural Areas have less than 2,500.
Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html
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Table 2: Participant Demographics
Participant Hospital

Role

Job Title

Sex

Chief Quality Officer
Chief Information
Security Officer
Emergency Manager
V.P. Patient Care
Services
Director of IT Systems
Emergency
Preparedness
Coordinator
Chief Operating
Officer
Chief Information
Security Officer
Safety Director

1
2

Α
𝐴

Administrator
IT

3

𝐴

Emerg Mgmt

4

𝐵

Administrator

5
6

𝐵
𝐵

IT
Emerg Mgmt

7

𝐶

Administrator

8

𝐶

IT

9

𝐶

Emerg Mgmt
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F
M

Years in
Field
10
15

Highest
Education
Masters
Associates

M

14

F

7

Registered
Nurse
Masters

M
M

10
10

Masters
Registered
Nurse

M

8

F

3

Doctor of
Medicine
Masters

M

26

Masters

Appendix
Appendix 1: Cover Letter for Interview Participants
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Appendix 2: Interview Protocol

Date: _______________

Time: ___________ (Start) ____________ (End)

Interviewer: ___________________________

Interviewee: _____________________________

Thank you for agreeing to take time out of your schedule to meet with me to discuss your organizations response to and recovery
from a malware attack. Your personal and organizational involvement in this project will be kept as confidential as legally possible. All data
will be reported in aggregate. IRB approval has been obtained for this project, and a copy of approval can be provided upon request. You have
been provided an informational cover letter via email to further explain this research project. If you wish to continue with the interview, please
reply with a verbal ‘yes’.

 Interviewee Consented
 Interviewee Did Not Consent. The Interview is Over.
Just a note before we get started, it is okay if you do not know the answer to some of these questions. Also, please don’t feel like
you have to answer every question. If there is a question you don’t know or don’t feel comfortable answering, please let me know
and we will skip to the next question.
Domain

Demographic
Information

Questions

Probes

Department: Administration, Information Technology,
Emergency Management
Gender: Male, Female, Other
How long have you been in this field?
Training for Job

What field did you work in prior to this?
A degree program? Any special certifications?
Experience with the type of tasks?
Is it something you would like to dedicate more time
and resources to preparing for?

Issue Salience
How important is this issue to you?

Is it something you think about as a major
vulnerability to your system?
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What is your level of concern about this topic? (On a
scale from 1-10)

More or less since your attack?
What about colleagues at other systems talking
about this type of threat?

Do you hear people talking about this more or less
now?

Situational
Awareness

Please explain a little about the sequence of events when
your organization realized this was a malware attack.

How did your organization realize they were
infected with malware?

What did your initial response time look like?

Do you know how long the virus was in the
system before it was realized?

Please explain how the malware impacted your
hospital.
System Impact

How many hard drives were affected within
your organization?
What major applications were lost?
Were any patient appointments impacted?--Surgery, Inpatient, Outpatient?
Was your data restore from backups? How
recent were the backups?
What about other systems, like security
cameras?

How much of an impact did this have on your system?
Was more than one hospital impacted?
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Were there any ambulatory care centers
impacted?

What was the period to get back to normal business?

Recovery/Business
Continuity

How many individuals were responding to this
attack?
• Staff from your facility
• Staff from a health system
• Staff from vendor companies

How this response compared to other all-hazard
responses?
What about this event made it different or the
same?
Do you see this threat as different or the same to
other hazards?
Was your all-hazards plan sufficient to handle the response
to cyber-attack?

Organizational
Preparedness

What were your organization’s preparedness efforts
before the attack?
What were your organization’s preparedness efforts
after the attack?
Have there been any other attacks on your
organization?
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If different, what would you change to be more
suited for this type of threat?

Cyber security training? Sending test phishing emails
to employees? Creating a cyber response plan?

If so, what sort of impact on the system did they
have?

Do you feel there are barriers to preparing for this
type of threat?
How do you think these barriers could be overcome?

Well that concludes all the questions I have, is there anything else you would like to add? Have I missed anything about your
hospital’s event that you think is important for me to know?
Thanks again for taking the time to let me interview you today.

90

IV. Chapter 4

Perceptions of Hospital Emergency Preparedness for Cyber Threats:
A Statewide Survey
Authors:
Lauren E. Branch1
Warren S. Eller2
Tom K. Bias3
Michael A. McCawley1
Douglas J. Myers1
Brian J. Gerber4
John R. Bassler5

Affiliations:
1
Department of Occupational & Environmental Health Sciences, West Virginia University,
Morgantown, WV 26506, USA
2
Department of Public Management, The City University of New York, New York, NY 10019,
USA
3
Department of Health Policy, Leadership & Management, West Virginia University,
Morgantown, WV 26506, USA
4
School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ 85004, USA
5
Department of Biostatistics, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, USA

91

Abstract
Introduction: The healthcare industry has recently become the number one target for
cyberattack in the United States. As an industry, healthcare has become extremely dependent
upon digital technologies for care delivery. Cyberattacks threaten healthcare delivery and put
patient lives and data at risk. Federal requirements from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services on emergency preparedness help ensure hospitals’ abilities to respond to hazards
while continuing to provide patient care. How hospitals are applying to this mandate to cyber
hazards against their organizations remains unclear, but evidence shows healthcare remains
vulnerable.
Methods: A survey tool was developed to assess organizational preparedness and individual
perceptions of preparedness for cyberattack. The survey was sent out to all emergency
management/safety professionals within a statewide hospital association. Descriptive statistics
were used for the survey variables to provide insight into organizational readiness.
Results: The response rate was 29.7% (n= 27) for emergency management/safety
professionals. Most (63%) emergency management respondents reported having cyberspecific response protocols. However, only a third of the same population reported having both
an all-hazards plan and a continuity of operations plan that could be used for cyber incidents,
although both are required by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Almost 30% of
participants responded with not confident or only somewhat confident that their organizations
could handle cyber threats against their systems. The top barrier to organizations being more
prepared for cyber threats was lack of financial resources.
Discussion: Participants of the survey felt confident in their individual and organizational abilities
to respond to a cyberattack, but when asked about their organization’s concrete preparedness
actions their answers were not as strong. While completing the survey participants may not
have wanted to appear vulnerable and selected answers with higher confidence than they felt.
Research shows this threat will continue to evolve and increase over time. Healthcare must
take steps to be more secure as an industry, including increased IT security and increased
emergency management procedures. While healthcare remains vulnerable, so too does patient
data and safety. It is essential for the healthcare industry to invest heavily in cybersecurity and
preparedness to protect patients from these attacks.

92

Introduction
In 2015, healthcare became the number one targeted industry for cyberattack (Morgan,
2016). The healthcare industry became into a prime target largely due to valuable health data
which can be sold for a profit and their dependence on digital technology for patient care make
them more likely to pay ransom (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016). There were
over 100 million healthcare records breached in 2015 (Morgan, 2016). Then in 2016,
cyberattacks on healthcare started to include ransom demands. The first ransomware attack on
a United States hospital occurred when hackers shut down access to the hospital’s digital
network and demanded a ransom payment for the decryption key. After a two-week standoff,
the hospital made the ransom payment to regain access to their systems.

Since this initial

attack, the healthcare industry has seen an increase in attacks, and the attempts against them
are only expected to increase (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016).
Cyberattacks against this industry threaten healthcare delivery as well as patient safety
(Ayala, 2016). A global ransomware attack in 2017 left hospitals across Great Britain locked out
of their systems and the National Health Service was forced to cancel patient appointments and
divert patients to unaffected emergency rooms (Graham, 2017). This attack and the effects
seen in Great Britain were said to have put patients’ lives directly at risk (Chappell & Neuman,
2017). One worry for future attacks is the vulnerability that exists with medical devices. On
average, one hospital room has up to 20 networked devices, and larger hospitals can have
around 85,000 connected devices (Silverman, 2018).

Healthcare IT professionals express

their concerns for these devices because they were designed by vendors who do not
necessarily have security in mind. These devices can serve as point of entry in to the network
for hackers to gain access to health data or to alter the devices intended purpose (Ayala, 2016).

To ensure healthcare organizations (HCOs) are prepared for different hazards that
threaten patient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) developed
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Emergency Preparedness requirements that Medicare and Medicaid service providers must
follow. As part of this regulation, providers are required to conduct a risk assessment and
develop an emergency plan related to their top hazards, as well as to provide staff training and
testing of their emergency plans annually (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018).
This emergency preparedness regulation is meant to ensure HCOs are ready to handle hazards
that can impact their organizations while still providing care to the patients in their facilities and
in their communities.
Even with these federally mandated requirements in place, the healthcare industry has
not given enough credence to cyber threats within their assessments and plans. Without an
accurate representation of the risk these hazards pose to healthcare, the industry remains
vulnerable to cybersecurity threats (Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017). A recent
study by the authors found hospitals who went through this type of event felt it was unlike any
other emergency they’d dealt with in their healthcare experiences. Respondents mentioned
both the length of the event and the breadth of impact the event had on their organizations as
key factors that differentiated it from other hazards. Each of the facilities interviewed now have
response protocols more tailored towards cyberattack. Stakeholders also mentioned their
concerns for the lack of information sharing across the healthcare industry with regards to how
HCOs should best prepare for and respond to cyber hazards.
The focus of this study is to examine hospital readiness for cyber threats by asking what
HCOs do to prepare for this hazard and what barriers are in place at the organizational level to
increase preparedness and prevent successful attacks. Currently, the healthcare industry has
become the number one target for attempted breaches, and studies have shown they are
behind other industries with security and preparedness in the cyber arena (Columbus, 2018;
Kruse et al., 2017). By collecting information on organizational preparedness, this study seeks
to address the gap between awareness and preparedness and understanding the organizational
barriers to mitigating cyber threats. A survey was created based on existing literature and
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previously conducted interviews with key stakeholders to help achieve this objective. The
survey was disseminated to safety/emergency management and information technology staff
from healthcare organizations to measure their knowledge and their perceptions of the
organization’s preparedness for cyber threats.

Methods
A survey with experimental design was developed and delivered to healthcare
organizations to identify readiness levels as well as barriers to preparing for a cyberattack.
Survey questions were developed based on background literature, as well as information
collected during the previous trend analysis and stakeholder experience studies conducted by
the authors. Background conversations with subject matter experts, including hospital
administrators, information technology experts, FBI agents, emergency managers, also shaped
the survey questions.
The first part of the survey collected demographic information from participants including
department, age, education, and years of experience. The next part of the survey measured
organizational preparedness for cyberattacks based on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services Emergency Preparedness Ruling. Participants were asked questions related to these
requirements, such as how often their organizations are exercising their response plans,
conducting staff awareness training, and doing risk assessments related to cyber vulnerabilities
within their system (Graham, Shirm, Liggin, Altken, & Dick, 2006). The final part of the survey
gathered the participant’s perceptions of preparedness for cyber threats against healthcare.
This section was broken in to two parts, the first examining participants’ perceptions of their own
individual preparedness and the second examining participants’ perceptions of organizational
preparedness (Dorn, Savoia, Testa, Stoto, & Marcus, 2007). Topics covered in both sections,
related to cyberattack, included performance of duties, providing assistance and information to
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staff, contacting appropriate personnel, and handling the event. A Likert-type scale was used
with these questions to measure participant confidence. Finally, participants were asked to rank
their organizations overall preparedness for cyber incidents and identify any barriers that exist at
an organizational level to being more prepared for this type of hazard. This survey was created
in REDCap, and a copy can be found in Appendix 2.
The hospital association for one state agreed to participate in the study. Staff of
affiliated hospitals who work in hospital Emergency Management/Safety were asked to
participate in the survey. This member group has 91 members. Due to the sensitive nature of
the survey topic, the hospital association agreed to participate only if they were able to keep
their member list private. The researchers created a message which included a brief
introduction, the purpose of the study, and a link to the survey. The copy of the included cover
letter is included in Appendix 1. This message was sent out to the Emergency
Management/Safety members by the hospital association liaison. Individuals who wished to
complete the survey were asked to consent by clicking on the link that took them directly to the
online survey. One additional follow-up email was sent by the hospital association as a
reminder to members to complete the survey.
There were also four IT participants who completed the survey. They received the
survey through emergency management/safety staff who forwarded the survey email and link to
ask them to participate. Although other statistical methods have been considered, the
explorative nature of the hypothesis and data collection limit the scope of statistical
methodology that can be applied. As the survey tool utilized is self-reported data, combined with
the disparity of sample sizes among emergency management/safety and IT professionals,
descriptive statistics provide insight into organizational readiness. Descriptive statistics were
calculated by professional title for all elements of the survey. Missing data is reported in the
tables; however, frequencies and percentages do not include missing values in the respective
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calculation. All analyses were conducted using SAS 9.4. The survey results still provide
valuable insight in to the perceptions of cyber preparedness across healthcare emergency
management and safety professionals.
Results
There were 31 total survey respondents; 27 from emergency management/safety and 4
from information technology. The original objective of the study was to compare perceptions of
preparedness between emergency management/safety professionals and information
technology (IT) professionals. A healthcare IT association located in the same state as the
hospital association was pursued to participate in the survey, but they ultimately declined to
have their members participate. The survey had a 29.7% response rate from emergency
management/safety professionals. Due to the nature of how IT professionals received the
survey link, their response rate is unknown.
Respondent demographics are laid out in Table 1. The survey sample from emergency
management professionals was almost equally distributed between males and females,
however the information technology participants were all males. The average age of the
emergency management group was 49.8 years old, whereas the average age of the information
technology group was 42.7 years old. The majority of respondents either had their bachelor’s
degree or their master’s degree (a combined 67.7% of respondents). The largest group of
respondents had between 10 and 20 years of experience in their respective career fields. Table
1 also displays participants level of comfort using technology to complete daily tasks in their
workplace. Most respondents said they were very comfortable using technology (64.52%),
whereas 35.48% of respondents said they were either comfortable or somewhat comfortable.
When the information technology participants were removed from the sample, the level of
comfort dropped to 59.2% of emergency management professionals responding with very
comfortable with technology use to complete daily job duties.
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Organizational Preparedness
This portion of the survey addressed federally mandated emergency preparedness
requirements, as well as preparedness actions taken by the organizations to be more secure
against cyber threats. Results from this portion of the survey can be found in Table 2. More
than a quarter of emergency management participants (25.9%) and a quarter of information
technology participants responded their organizations did not or only somewhat have enough
resources to address cybersecurity concerns.
There are different types of emergency plans that healthcare organizations use, an allhazards plan and a continuity of operations or business continuity plan, both required by CMS
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). Both plans ensure healthcare providers
can handle hazards that occur and get back to normal business in order to continue providing
patient care and serving their community. Only a third of emergency managers responded with
having both plans capable of being used for cyber events. Eight of the respondents (29.6%)
said that in addition to these two plans, they also had cyber-specific response protocols.
Twelve of the respondents (44.4%) only selected one of the plan options for their organization.
Another requirement from CMS is for emergency plans to be drilled or exercised
annually (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). Nearly half of the participants
said their organizations have either never drilled or exercised a cyber scenario or they did not
know whether their organization had done so (48.1%). When asked about another Emergency
Preparedness Requirement, staff awareness training, two thirds of respondents said their
organizations either never had training or had annual training. During a previous study, IT and
Emergency Management stakeholders expressed how often the field of cybersecurity is
evolving and how it only takes one employee to have poor cyber-habits to let a hacker in to the
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system. The organizations from that project had been victims of malware attacks, and as part of
their preparedness actions moving forward increased the amount of training they provide to staff
to increase their overall security. The final requirement of the Emergency Preparedness Ruling
addressed in this survey is the need to conduct a facility risk assessment. Survey respondents
overwhelmingly (70%) replied their organization includes cybersecurity in their facility risk
assessment at least annually.
Perceptions of Preparedness
The perceptions portion of the survey utilized Likert Scale questions to obtain the
respondents’ perceptions of cyber preparedness both as an individual and how they perceive
their organization’s preparedness level. The questions throughout this section appear to
receive similar results. On an individual level, most respondents said they were either
somewhat confident or confident they could perform their response duties, provide information
to others in the organization, and handle the event within their department (Table 3a). The
outlier of these questions was whether the respondents would be able to contact the appropriate
personnel to activate their organization’s emergency response protocols. Almost all the
respondents (87.1%) expressed they were either confident or very confident with activation
protocols. This increased level of confidence could be due to activation of hospital emergency
response protocols generally being the same for all hazards, and individuals feel confident in
notifying the appropriate personnel from previous experiences.
Generally, the respondents answered the same for the questions related to
organizational preparedness (Table 3b). Between 19% and 30% of emergency management
respondents selected somewhat confident to all questions, and between 50% and 70% of the
same group selected confident. The IT respondents on the other hand reported between 75%
and 100% they were confident or very confident in their organizational preparedness levels.
One interesting observation in this survey section is that 29% of respondents answered not
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confident or somewhat confident regarding their organization ability to handle cyber threats that
threaten their network. This question received lower confidence rating that the other
organizational preparedness questions, even though the other questions are all related to the
ability for their organization to respond to a cyber threat.
Participants were also asked to rate their organization’s overall preparedness for a cyber
incident. A third of respondents rated their organization’s overall preparedness as either not
prepared or only somewhat prepared (Table 3c). When asked whether their organization had
experienced a significant security event in the last 12 months, the majority of respondents
(83.9%) answered they had not (Table 2). It is possible that this experience could impact their
levels of confidence regarding their individual and organizational abilities to respond to
cyberattack. In future research, a larger sample size may be able to show whether experiencing
a cyberattack has an impact on confidence levels related to organizational readiness.
Barriers
The final question of the survey asked participants what barriers to their organizations
ability to be more prepared for cyberattacks (Table 3c). The list of barriers was adapted from
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Cybersecurity Survey.
(HIMSS North America, 2018). Five of the top six selected barriers from the HIMSS Survey
were chosen for this survey. The choices were selected based on answers to a barriers
question during the stakeholder research project. The top two barrier selections from the
HIMSS survey swapped places with our survey respondents. The highest rated barrier selected
by respondents was lack of financial resources. While this is not a new theme for barriers of
hospital emergency preparedness, this was an interesting observation in this population
because in Part 2 of the survey only 6.5% of respondents felt their organization did not have
enough resources to address cybersecurity concerns (Cagliuso, 2014). The second most
selected barrier was lack of appropriate personnel. In the previous study by the authors,
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stakeholders noted a concern was lacking a full-time employee dedicated to emergency
management at many facilities. The stakeholders also noted the struggle of IT departments to
stay on top of the constantly evolving cyber security front. Related to the ever-changing nature
of this threat, the third most selected barrier was too many new and emerging threats. While
barriers to healthcare emergency management exist for all hazards, healthcare has become the
number one industry targeted for cyberattack. To protect patient care and protected data,
hospital administrators must realize how essential the roles of emergency management and
information technology departments are to keep their systems secure.
Discussion
Data collected from this survey document participants perceptions of preparedness for
cyberattack within their healthcare facility. Overall, the survey results showed high confidence
levels in individual ability and in organizational ability to respond to a cyberattack. Almost all
respondents (87.1%) said they were confident or very confident in their ability to contact the
appropriate personnel for event response activation. Regarding performance of individual
response duties, 80% of participants answered they were either confident or very confident in
their own ability. Most participants (73.3%) answered confident or very confident in their
organization’s ability to secure their system during a cyberattack, and eighty percent of
participants gave the same answers regarding their organization’s ability to ensure continuation
of patient care without digital technology.
While the respondents answered with relatively high confidence levels about their
preparedness perceptions, when asked about their organizations actions to be prepared for
cyber threats a few disparities became apparent. Only a third of survey participants reported
having an all-hazards plan and a business continuity plan that could be used for cyberattacks,
both of which are required by CMS for all providers to ensure the ability to handle hazards and
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safeguard continuation of care. While the question was related specifically to use against cyber
hazards, the CMS requirements are meant to guarantee hospitals can protect patient care
during any emergency event. Without the ability to use their emergency plan during a
cyberattack, it is unclear if the hospitals questioned have a plan to respond while safeguarding
patient care. Another discrepancy across survey responses was 74.1% of individuals reported
their organization had enough resources to address cyber security concerns, yet when asked
about barriers to being more prepared respondents’ top choices were lack of financial resources
and lack of appropriate personnel.
This study provided valuable insight in to the preparedness actions of healthcare
facilities and stakeholders’ perceptions of their organizational ability to respond to a cyberattack.
An objective of this survey, to compare perceptions between departments, was not fulfilled due
to the small sample size. The IT organization may have declined to participate due to the
private nature of cyberattacks and the concern to admit vulnerabilities exist within the state.
This same concern was expressed by the participating hospital association, however they were
willing to participate as long as the association and its members could remain anonymous.
While this survey had an average response rate for an online survey, the results may not be
generalizable to all organizations statewide (Nulty, 2008). Future research efforts need to focus
on expanding the size of the sample population as well as gain more participation from
association members. It is also important to note that the survey questions were collecting
information on the respondent’s perceptions of readiness to respond to a cyberattack and to
continue providing patient care during an attack, but most facilities haven’t experienced a cyber
attack. Only 16.1% of respondents reported their organizations having had a significant
security incident in the past 12 months. Previous research has shown individuals who
experience a cyberattack express a change in their understanding of what happens during
attacks within healthcare organizations. This would be another variable to consider comparing
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preparedness perceptions across within a larger sample size. Finally, due to the sensitive
nature of this threat healthcare organizations across the country are choosing to keep
information private. This was a concern expressed by both professional groups approached to
participate in this research project. This desire to keep data confidential may have led to
response bias in the survey results. Respondents could have reported higher confidence levels
not wanting their organization to seem vulnerable to such attacks. This response bias could
explain the differences seen between perceptions of preparedness and the preparedness
actions seen across the participant organizations.
Even though the participants in this survey reported feeling relatively confident in their
organizations ability to respond to a cyberattack, previous research has shown individuals in
healthcare are less confident overall about their system security and ability to respond to
attacks. A recent survey of Health IT professionals found that 60% were not confident in their
medical devices security strategies to protect patient care (Silverman, 2018). It is also apparent
that healthcare remains vulnerable (Kasumov, 2018). Healthcare Organizations have continued
to be targeted and in 2018 there have been large scale cyberattacks against hospitals,
healthcare providers, and third-party healthcare vendors (Duffy, 2018). During these attacks,
the reliability of all health data becomes questionable. Organizations and providers must find
out if the information they are seeing is accurate or has it been altered in some way, including
data from patient records, diagnosis equipment, and treatment equipment (Ayala, 2016).
Without accurate patient records and histories, patient care can be put at risk (Lachance, 2016).
This category of threat is different in nature than any other threat healthcare handles.
Healthcare is used to a certain level of downtime, but previous studies have shown this is unlike
any downtime they have prepared for. During cyberattacks, every digital device and application
within the facility can go down at one time and there is the potential for these to remain offline
for an extended period. To be prepared, HCOs need to include cyber hazards when conducting
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risk assessments and to reevaluate emergency plans to ensure they account for these cyber
incidents. It is essential for hospitals to have plans in place to ensure continuation of care and
patient safety during this level of downtime. HCOs also need to develop an exercise and drilling
plan to practice their cyber procedures with employees, as well as strengthen their training
programs with staff members to ensure their staff know what to do and how to remain vigilant
(Rafee, 2018). The banking industry used to be the number one targeted area for cyberattacks
in 2014, but after a surge in their cybersecurity budgets banking dropped down to number three
in 2015 (Morgan, 2016).
The healthcare industry itself is also changing and becoming even more dependent on a
digital environment. With new delivery avenues becoming more popular, such as telemedicine
and patient portals, the attack surface within the field is expanding (Adefala, 2018; Sullivan,
2018. This threat against healthcare is not disappearing, and cyberattacks are expected to
increase (Duffy, 2018). Barriers identified by study participants include lack of financial
resources and lack of appropriate personnel. Federal funding for the Hospital Preparedness
Program has been cut by 50% over the last 15 years from $515 million in FY2003 to $255
million in FY2017 (Watson, Watson, & Sell, 2017). There is a need for sustained federal
support for hospital emergency preparedness to sustain their response capabilities. Another
source of funding could come from the healthcare organizations themselves. Currently,
healthcare is the now the second biggest sector of the United States’ economy, yet the
healthcare industry only spends about half on cybersecurity as other industries (Silverman,
2018). Cases need to be made for the return on investment (ROI) to advancing cybersecurity
resources (Adefala, 2018; Rafee, 2018). Data about the risk and impact of cyberattacks needs
to be made more readily available for healthcare. This data along with identification of best
practices from case studies can be used to make ROI cases to hospital administrators. The
healthcare industry needs to become more open about these attacks to identify best practices
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and pool their preparedness resources. These attacks will continue to get more sophisticated
and continue to threaten patient care and safety. Research has shown all devices in the
healthcare setting are at risk of being infiltrated and altered. The healthcare industry is charged
with doing no harm to the population they serve, and to do nothing for such a clear threat is
irresponsible.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Demographic Information
Table 1. Demographic Information

Response Variables by Department

Age*
Gender

Education Level

Years of Experience

How comfortable do you feel
using technology in your
workplace to complete your
daily tasks?

Male
Female
Doctorate Degree
Master's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Associate Degree
High School / GED
Other
0 - 10
10 - 20
20 - 30
30 - 40
40 - 50
Not Comfortable
Somewhat Comfortable
Comfortable
Very Comfortable

Total
(N = 31)

Emergency
Management/Safety (N
= 27)

Information
Technology
(N = 4)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

48.93 (10.42)
17 (54.84)
14 (45.16)
1 (3.23)
11 (35.48)
10 (32.26)
4 (12.90)
4 (12.90)
1 (3.23)
6 (19.35)
12 (38.71)
6 (19.35)
5 (16.13)
2 (6.45)
0 (0.00)
3 (9.68)
8 (25.81)
20 (64.52)

* Summary statistics reported for age are Mean (Standard Deviation)
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49.85 (10.38)
13 (48.15)
14 (51.85)
1 (3.70)
10 (37.04)
7 (25.93)
4 (14.81)
4 (14.81)
1 (3.70)
5 (18.52)
10 (37.04)
6 (22.22)
4 (14.81)
2 (7.41)
0 (0.00)
3 (11.11)
8 (29.63)
16 (59.26)

42.75 (9.67)
4 (100.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
3 (75.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
2 (50.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
4 (100.00)

Table 2: Cyber Preparedness- Emergency Management Requirements
Table 2. Preparedness Information

Response Variables by Department

Do you feel your organization has enough
resources to address cybersecurity concerns?

Does your organization have an emergency
plan for cyber events?

Does your organization drill or exercise its
response to a cyber event for staff to know
what steps to take to mitigate the effects of a
successful attack?

How comfortable do you feel using technology
in your workplace to complete your daily
tasks?

Does your organization do cybersecurity risk
assessments to identify system vulnerabilities?
Has your organization experienced a
significant security incident in the past 12
months?

Total
(N = 31)

Emergency
Management/Safety
(N = 27)

Information
Technology
(N = 4)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

Yes
Somewhat
No
None
Cyber-Specific Response
Protocols
All-Hazards Plan
Continuity of Operations Plan
Other
Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Do Not Know
Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Do Not Know
Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Do Not Know
Yes

23 (74.19)
6 (19.35)
2 (6.45)
1 (3.23)

20 (74.07)
6 (22.22)
1 (3.70)
1 (3.70)

3 (75.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
0 (0.00)

19 (60.29)

17 (62.96)

2 (50.00)

7 (22.58)
3 (9.68)
1 (3.23)
10 (32.26)
15 (48.39)
1 (3.23)
0 (0.00)
5 (16.13)
7 (22.58)
15 (48.39)
6 (19.35)
1 (3.23)
2 (6.45)
0 (0.00)
12 (38.71)
5 (16.13)
6 (19.35)
8 (25.51)
5 (16.13)

6 (22.22)
3 (11.11)
0 (0.00)
8 (29.63)
13 (48.15)
1 (3.70)
0 (0.00)
5 (18.52)
6 (22.22)
12 (44.44)
6 (22.22)
1 (3.70)
2 (7.41)
0 (0.00)
9 (33.33)
5 (18.52)
5 (18.52)
8 (29.63)
5 (18.52)

1 (25.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
2 (50.00)
2 (50.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
3 (75.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
3 (75.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)

No

22 (70.97)

22 (81.48)

4 (100.00)
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Table 3a: Perceptions of Individual Preparedness for Cyber Hazards
Table 3a. Preparedness Perceptions
Total
(N = 31)

In the event of a cyber-event, how well do you feel you will
be able to:

Perform response duties you will
be expected to accomplish?

Provide assistance and
information to others within
organization?
Contact the appropriate
personnel to activate event
response?

Handle the event within your
department/team?

Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident

Frequency (%)
0 (0.00)
6 (20.00)
21 (70.00)
3 (10.00)
1
1 (3.23)
7 (22.58)
18 (58.06)
5 (16.13)
0 (0.00)
4 (12.90)
14 (45.16)
13 (41.94)
1 (3.23)
6 (19.35)
16 (51.61)
8 (25.81)

* Missing data is not included in the calculated percentages
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Emergency
Management/Safety
(N = 27)

Information
Technology
(N = 4)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

0 (0.00)
6 (23.08)
18 (69.23)
2 (7.69)
1
1 (3.7)
7 (25.93)
14 (51.85)
5 (18.52)
0 (0.00)
4 (14.81)
12 (44.44)
11 (40.74)
1 (25)
0 (0)
2 (50)
1 (25)

0 (0.00)
0 (0)
3 (75)
1 (25)
0
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (100)
0 (0)
0 (0.00)
0 (0)
2 (50)
2 (50)
0 (0)
6 (22.22)
14 (51.85)
7 (25.93)

Table 3b: Perceptions of Organizational Preparedness for Cyber Hazards
Table 3b. Preparedness Perceptions
Total
(N = 31)

Presently, how well do you think your organization is
able to:

Perform response duties your
organization will be expected to
accomplish?

Provide assistance and
information to staff within the
main hospital?

Provide assistance and
information to staff within
satellite offices/ambulatory care
centers?

Secure the system (i.e. stop the
spread of virus)?

Ensure continuation of patient
care (i.e. switch to pen and
paper records)?

Handle potential cyber threats
that threaten your network?

Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident
Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*
Not Confident

Frequency (%)
0 (0.00)
7 (23.33)
20 (66.67)
3 (10.00)
1
0 (0.00)
5 (16.67)
22 (73.33)
3 (10.00)
1
0 (0.00)
7 (25.93)
19 (70.37)
0 (0.00)
4
0 (0.00)
8 (26.67)
17 (56.67)
5 (16.67)
1
0 (0.00)
6 (20.00)
20 (66.67)
4 (13.33)
1
1 (3.33)

Somewhat Confident
Confident
Very Confident
Missing*

* Missing data is not included in the calculated percentages
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Emergency
Management/Safety
(N = 27)

Information
Technology
(N = 4)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

0 (0.00)
7 (26.92)
16 (61.54)
3 (11.54)
1
0 (0.00)
5 (19.23)
18 (69.23)
3 (11.54)
1
0 (0.00)
7 (29.17)
16 (66.67)
1 (4.17)
3
0 (0.00)
7 (26.92)
15 (57.69)
4 (15.38)
1
0 (0.00)
5 (19.23)
18 (69.23)
3 (11.54)
1
1 (3.85)

0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
4 (100.00)
0 (0.00)
0
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
4 (100.00)
0 (0.00)
0
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
3 (100.00)
0 (0.00)
1
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
2 (50.00)
1 (25.00)
0
0 (0.00)
1 (25)
2 (50)
1 (25)
0
0 (0)

8 (26.67)
14 (46.67)
7 (22.58)

7 (26.92)
13 (50)
5 (19.23)

1 (25)
1 (25)
2 (50)

1

1

0

Table 3c: Overall Preparedness Perceptions for Cyber Hazards
Table 3c. Preparedness Perceptions
Total
(N = 31)

Response Question by Department

Overall, how would you rate your
organization's preparedness level
to respond to and mitigate the
effects of a cybersecurity
incident?

What do you feel the biggest
barriers are to your organization
being MORE prepared for a
cybersecurity incident?

Not Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Prepared
Very Prepared
Missing*
Lack of Appropriate Personnel
Lack of Financial Resources
Too Many Application Vulnerabilities
Too Many Endpoints to the Network
Too Many New and Emerging Threats
Complex Network Infrastructure
Unable to be Properly Secured
Other
Do Not Know
Missing*

* Missing data is not included in the calculated percentages
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Frequency (%)
1 (3.33)
8 (26.67)
17 (56.67)
4 (13.33)
1
6 (20.00)
8 (26.67)
1 (3.33)
3 (10.00)
5 (16.67)

Emergency
Management/Safety
(N = 27)

Information
Technology
(N = 4)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

1 (3.85)
7 (26.92)
14 (53.85)
4 (29.63)
1
5 (19.23)
7 (26.92)
1 (3.85)
3 (11.54)
4 (15.38)

0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)
3 (75.00)
0 (0.00)
0
1 (25.00)
1 (25.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
1 (25.00)

2 (6.67)

1 (3.85)

1 (25.00)

2 (6.67)
3 (10.00)
1

2 (7.69)
3 (11.54)
1

0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0

Appendix
Appendix 1: Cover Letter to participants explaining the survey

Phone: 304-293-7073
Fax: 304-293-3098
http://oric.research.wvu.edu

Chestnut Ridge Research Building
886 Chestnut Ridge Road
PO Box 6845
Morgantown, WV 26506-6845

Appendix 2: Healthcare Cyber Preparedness and Perceptions Survey
Resize font:
|

Healthcare Cyber Preparedness and Perceptions

This research survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Your answers will remain anonymous, and all
data will be reported in aggregate. Your participation is completely voluntary. You may skip any question that you d
not wish to answer, and you may discontinue at any time.
When finished, please click the Submit
"
" button at the bottom of the survey.
Thank you for your time and help with this project.

Part 1: Demographic Information
1.1 What is your gender?

Male
Female
reset

1.2 What is your age (in years)?
1.3 Which of the following departments do you work in?

Emergency Management/Safety
Information Technology
reset
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Executive Management
Non-Executive Management (i.e. midlevel
or senior management)
1.4 Which of the following best describes your job title?

Non-Management (i.e. specialist,
analyst, tech)
Other
reset

1.5 How many years of experience do you have in your
career field?

Doctorate Degree (i.e. PhD, MD)
Master's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Associate's Degree
1.6 What is your level of education?

High School/GED
Other
reset

1.7 Do you have any professional certifications related
to your job duties?
Yes
No
reset

1.8 How comfortable do you feel using technology in
your workplace to complete your daily tasks?
Not Comfortable
Somewhat Comfortable
Comfortable
Very Comfortable
reset
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Part 2: Preparedness Information

2.1 Do you feel your organization has enough
resources to address cybersecurity concerns?
Yes
Somewhat
No
reset

2.2

Does your organization have an emergency plan for
cyber events? (Select all that apply)

None
Cyber-specific response
protocols
All-hazards plan
Continuity of Operations Plan
(COOP)
Other

2.3

Does your organization drill or exercise its
response to a cyber event for staff to know what
steps to take to mitigate the effects of a successful
attack?

Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Don't Know
reset
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2.4

Does your organization hold cybersecurity
awareness training for staff to prevent a successful
attack (i.e. how to avoid click baits)?

Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Don't Know
reset

2.5 Does your organization do cybersecurity risk
identify system vulnerabilities?

Never
Yearly
Quarterly
Monthly
Don't Know
reset

2.6 Has your organization experienced a significant
security incident in the past 12 months?

Yes
No
reset

Part 3: Preparedness Perceptions

In the event of a cyber-event, how well do you feel you will be able to:

Not Confident

Somewhat
Confident

Confident

Very Confident

3.1.1 Perform response duties you will be
expected to accomplish?
reset
3.1.2 Provide assistance and information to
others within organization?
reset

117

3.1.3 Contact the appropriate personnel to
activate event response?
reset
3.1.4 Handle the event within your
department/team?
reset

Presently, how well do you think your organization is able to:

Not Confident

Somewhat
Confident

Confident

Very Confident

3.2.1 Perform response duties your organization
will be expected to accomplish?
reset
3.2.2 Provide assistance and information to staff
within the main hospital?
reset
3.2.3 Provide assistance and information to staff
within satellite
offices/ambulatory care centers? (If this
is not applicable to your organization,
please leave blank)
reset
3.2.4 Secure the system (i.e. stop the spread of
virus)?
reset
3.2.5 Ensure continuation of patient care (i.e.
switch to pen and paper records)?
reset
3.2.6 Handle potential cyber threats that
threaten your network?
reset
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3.3 Overall, how would you rate your organization's
preparedness level to respond to and mitigate the
effects of a cybersecurity incident?

Not Prepared
Somewhat Prepared
Prepared
Very Prepared

reset

3.4 What do you feel the biggest barriers are to your
organization being MORE prepared for a
cybersecurity incident (Select all that apply):

c

Lack of
appropriate
personnel
Lack of
financial
resources
Too many
application
vulnerabilities
Too many
endpoints to
the network
(i.e.
computers,
user devices)
Too many new
and emerging
threats
Complex
network
infrastructure
unable to be
properly
secured
Other
Don't Know
reset

Submit
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V. Summary
Introduction
The United States healthcare industry has recently found itself a target for
cybercriminals. As the field shifted towards electronic medical records, hackers realized they
could access valuable information worth even more than identity or financial information (Yao,
2017). Since 2015, healthcare has become the number one targeted industry for cyber
breaches (Columbus, 2018). There were over 1.9 million individuals impacted by reported data
breaches caused by hacking or IT incident in 2017 alone (United States Department of Health
and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2016).
A shift in cyber threats within healthcare was seen in 2016 as the first hospital was hit
with a ransomware attack. Ransomware attacks are a type of cyberattack where hackers
deliver a malware virus to a hospital network and can essentially lock the hospital out of their
own system while demanding a ransom payment for the decryption key. Hollywood
Presbyterian Hospital in Los Angeles, California was offline for over a week before settling with
hackers to pay a $17,000 ransom (Winton, 2016).
Due to the growing use of electronic medical records and the increasing dependence on
technology for care delivery, hospitals make a target often willing to pay to get their systems
back up and running. Patient care systems that can potentially be impacted during these
cyberattacks include patient history and medical charts, laboratory testing, diagnostic imaging,
medication dispensing, medical devices, and treatment devices. Without access to historical
data or these patient care systems providers may not be providing the best care or there could
be delays in care provided. This type of attack a healthcare facility can potentially put patient
safety at risk.

Since this first ransomware attack against the healthcare field, the trend has

only continued to grow (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016). While this hazard
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continues to threaten healthcare, data are still lacking regarding frequency, impact, and
recommended actions for healthcare organizations.
Summary of Key Findings
This research project was meant to serve as an exploratory study to examine an
emerging threat to public health. The overall purpose was to provide descriptive data on how
cyberattacks impact the four phases of the emergency cycle (preparedness, response,
mitigation, and recovery) within healthcare organizations (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2014). Data on publicly reported malware attacks was compiled in Study 1
(Chapter 2) to assess attack trends. Study 2 (Chapter 3) examined organizational practices on
mitigation and recovery from malware attacks. Data on organizational preparedness for cyber
threats was collected in Study 3 (Chapter 4). Due to this being a relatively new threat for
healthcare, research on the area is limited (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016; Kruse,
Frederick, Jacobson, & Monticone, 2017). The data collected from the studies as part of this
research project help to fill the gap in knowledge and help to elucidate the threat cyberattacks
pose to healthcare.
The trend analysis of public data identified 49 malware attacks on United States
healthcare providers between 2016 and 2017. Attacks occurred across 27 states, with
California seeing the highest frequency at 9 attacks during the two year time frame. Forty-one
of the attacks were labeled ransomware and eight of the incidents were labeled malware. Six of
the organizations reported paying ransom, whereas 43 organizations did not pay or did not
report payment to the press. The analysis identified a range of organizational impacts from
network downtime to patient and staff records being breached. The longest downtime reported
was 3 weeks, and there were four attacks that reported having more than 200,000 records
breached. This was the first known content analysis to summarize malware attack trends in
detail seen on United States healthcare providers, however reports from expert agencies report
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higher frequencies of attacks. The Healthcare Information Management Systems Society
conducts a cybersecurity survey each year and the 2018 survey revealed 75.7% of respondents
reported a significant security incident in the past 12 months (HIMSS North America, 2018).
While this is a large percentage, it is important to note the survey sample size was 239
healthcare organizations. Even though healthcare is facing this new threat, as an industry they
remain private when choosing to report these incidents due to the nature of attack and the
potential threat to patient care as well as the potential impact on the organization’s business
reputation for keeping information secure. This lack of reporting could explain the low number
or attacks found in public sources within the trend analysis.
Study 2 (Chapter 3) used data collected from stakeholder interviews to examine
organizational mitigation and recovery from malware attacks. The three organizations that
participated in this study experienced complete shutdowns of their networks during their
malware attack. The network outages lasted varying amounts of time based on how far the
virus was able to infect their systems. Two of the organizations saw devastating impacts and
were forced to operate within the incident command structure for over a month. These
organizations had to rebuild their networks with a cost upwards of $10 million. Stakeholders
from all categories (administrators, emergency managers, and information technology
managers) expressed this event being different from any other emergency they have faced
while in their healthcare careers. One of the key themes that emerged from the stakeholders
interviews was the realization of how technologically dependent they have become in healthcare
provision. One hospital administrator explained they are no longer able to take a blood sugar
reading without access to their electronic medical record. Stakeholders expressed concern for
this reliance on technology, but also expressed the benefit of technology in the health field.
Stakeholders expressed frustration in the reporting privacy that exists within the healthcare field.
They also identified the need for their industry to be more open with regard to cyberattack data.
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Multiple interview subjects believe this data would be useful in providing more accurate risk
assessments and give them the information they need to convince administrators to make
system improvements to become more secure.

The identification of the need to convince

administration to invest in safety and emergency management solutions is nothing new to the
field of hospital emergency management (Cagliuso, 2014a; Cagliuso, 2014b). However,
cyberattacks create a different need for emergency preparedness solutions that is not similar to
the other hazards healthcare faces.
This final study of this project (Chapter 4) expanded knowledge on organizational
preparedness for cyber threats. A survey was developed and delivered to emergency
managers within a statewide hospital association. The majority (63%) of emergency managers
reported having cyber-specific protocols within their organization. However, only a third of
respondents reported having both an all-hazards plan and a continuity of operations plan that
could be used during cyberattack. Both of these plans are requirements of Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and as part of the CMS Emergency Preparedness
Ruling must reflect the hazards identified in the facility’s thorough hazard vulnerability
assessment. With only a third of emergency managers reporting having plans that address
cyber threats, the other two thirds of participants must either feel they are not at risk for a
cyberattack or did not consider cyber threats to their organizations while conducting their risk
assessments. Also, 30% of participants responded with confidence or somewhat confident their
organizations could handle cyber threats against their systems. Based on Study 2, these
responses were unexpected because the participants said this was unlike any other emergency
they had faced and also felt they had misjudged the impact these attacks could have on their
system. When asked if their organizations could handle threats against their systems, almost
30% the survey participants reported they were not confident or only somewhat confident.
Finally, the survey asked about barriers to being more prepared and the participants identified
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lack of financial resources as the biggest barrier. While this is not unlike other healthcare
emergency management literature, it was unexpected because when asked if their
organizations have enough resources dedicated to cybersecurity 74% of emergency managers
answered ‘yes’ (Cagliuso, 2014a, Cagliuso 2014b). Response bias may have been a factor for
higher levels of confidence being reported than have been seen in other healthcare surveys.
Due to the private nature of healthcare regarding this threat topic, respondents may have
responded with higher confidence not wanting to make the state hospital association seem
vulnerable to attack.
Discussion
News and industry reports make it clear cyberattacks pose a real threat to healthcare
and are only expected to grow as a threat over time (Kasumov, 2018; Kruse et al., 2017; Luna
et al.). A recent report estimated healthcare experiences twice the number of cyberattacks as
seen in other industries (Adefala, 2018). The studies in this research project more clearly
illustrate what threat cyberattacks can pose to the healthcare industry. Data from studies
showed the frequency and impact of malware attacks as well as the steps being taken by
organizations to prepare for and to mitigate the effects of attacks. Across all studies, three main
points related to cybersecurity and public health preparedness were identified.
One point that appeared across all three studies was the current lack of research related
to cyberattacks and healthcare organizations. A 2017 systematic review found 31 articles
related to cyberattacks and healthcare and the reviewers noted most of the articles found were
news articles and not academic articles (Kruse et al., 2017). Not only is there lack of research
on this topic, but participants in the studies pointed out a lack of accessible data for those in the
field. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) collects data related to cyberattacks across all
industries. The FBI reported in 2015 they had received over 2,500 complaints of ransomware
across all industries (Radke, Waters, Cleary, Evans, & Kittle, 2016). We also know they have
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data because their local Fusion Centers are often called when a healthcare organizations is
attacked and local agents go out to the site to assist with response and collect evidence for
forensic testing. This participation by FBI agents was confirmed by participants in Study 2 when
discussing their organizational response to attack. Even though the FBI has this data, inquiries
to gain access to the data reports or to separate out healthcare data from other industries were
often met with refusals. I experienced these refusals when talking to two separate FBI agents
and stakeholders from Study 2 reported the same experiences. There is also public access to
data related to data breaches via the DHHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal. The recent
JAMA Article published in 2018 reviewed this data and showed that hacking and IT incidents
have not become the number one breach type. This data is not able to be further classified by
what type of hacking or IT incident, such as malware or ransomware attack. There are also
limitations on this data set because it only contains incidents that were reported due to data
breach. The studies conducted as part of this project identified cyber attack cases where no
breach was reported, and therefore the breach data is not inclusive of all malware attacks seen
on healthcare providers.
In addition to existing data being hard to access, the healthcare industry is also relatively
secretive regarding their attacks. As seen in Study 1 where only 49 malware attacks were
located in publicly reported information, based on existing statistics we know this number is an
extremely low estimate. With my own experience as an emergency management employee of a
healthcare organization during malware attack, administrators were very reticent about letting
the public know they were under attack. They expressed concern that patients would worry
about their safety when coming in for surgeries or that patients would unnecessarily be
concerned with their data privacy. This sentiment was also noted during interviews in Study 2.
Healthcare Organizations have both an ethical obligation to protect patients as well as a legal
obligation to protect patients’ data. An admission of a cyberattack could potentially be an
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admission to breaking either or both of these professional obligations. In order for healthcare to
be as prepared as they need to be for cybersecurity incidents, it is imperative that individuals in
the field of emergency management, safety, and information technology have accurate data that
represents the risks these threats pose to healthcare. With accurate and complete information,
they can more precisely classify cyber threats to their organizations on their risk assessments
and dedicate the needed resources to securing their digital environment.
Another point that was made within this research project is the potential cyberattacks
have to impact patient safety, both directly and indirectly. During one of the global malware
attacks, patient safety was determined to have been directly put at risk by the effects of the
attack (Chappell & Neuman, 2017). These effects included loss of access to patient records
and patient care equipment, as well as the diversion of patients en route to impacted hospitals
being sent further away and delaying the medical care they required. While limited data
currently exists in the academic arena, the healthcare and emergency management fields all
agree cyberattacks have the potential to negatively impact patient safety (Ayala, 2016;
Lachance, 2016; Barnett, Snell, Lord, Jenkins, Terbush, & Burke, 2013). Stakeholders in Study
2 identified potential for patient care impact during these events, however they were quick to
say they did not see a negative patient impact. One potential explanation for this is that while
the network is down so too is the error reporting within electronic medical records. Another
potential explanation for this is a legal requirement to keep the information confidential. Multiple
stakeholders asked during the interviews if their organization had given legal clearance to
discuss their facilities attack. So although they did not report a negative patient impact, there is
still the potential that it existed.
There is also literature that suggests the potential for active medical devices on the
network to become victims of cyberattack (Ayala, 2016; TrapX Labs, 2015). One of these
reports reviews case studies where hackers used medical devices to gain access to a network
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(TrapX Labs, 2015). While this report does not show evidence hackers used active medical
devices to alter patient care, it does show hackers have the ability to remotely gain access to
these devices. The other report goes more in detail about how hackers could potentially use
this access to hold patient’s lives on the line in exchange for ransom rather than locking
organizations out of their digital network (Ayala, 2016). A more common concern regarding
cyberattacks and patient safety is the reliability of health data being reported by patient care
equipment. Stakeholders in Study 2 expressed a concern their organization and providers had
during their attack to ensure all health data was accurately being relayed from one digital
platform to another. Patient care can be put at risk without access to up to date patient histories
and records (Lachance, 2016).
This threat also has the ability to impact patient health through the hospital environment.
One of the organizations that participated in Study 2 saw impacts to their HVAC systems. They
were forced to manually monitor air flow and temperature around their facility. If they had been
unable to keep safe temperature and air quality control, the facility would have been forced to
evacuate their patients. As seen in extreme weather conditions, such as Hurricanes Katrina,
and Sandy, evacuation of a hospital can be a complex task requiring coordination between large
amounts of staff and resources (Adalja, Watson, Bouri, Minton, Morhard, & Toner, 2014; NPR,
2013). Another of the organizations interviewed in Study 2 reported seeing impacts to their
security cameras. Due to their inability to visually monitor their entrances and exits, the facility
was forced to go in to lockdown and had to increase security presence. If someone with ill
intent were to enter the hospital during security downtime due to a cyberevent there is the
potential in that scenario as well for patients or visitors of the facility to be injured.
The final point emphasized across this research project is the healthcare field remains
vulnerable to cyberattack and needs more efforts for preparedness and security (Kasumov,
2018; Kruse et al., 2017). This industry lags behind other industries in cybersecurity, with many
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organizations having out of date cybersecurity systems and not enough training for staff on safe
cyber practices (Kruse et al., 2017). Even though healthcare has become the number one
targeted industry for cyberattack, they only spend about half as much as other sectors on
securing their digital platforms (Silverman, 2018). There has been a 50% decrease in funding
for federal hospital emergency preparedness funding over the last 15 years (Watson, Watson, &
Sell, 2017). There is a need for sustained funding to assist in healthcare’s overall emergency
preparedness needs. However, federal funding is only meant to serve as supplemental funding
for emergency preparedness. Healthcare is now the second largest sector of the U.S. economy
and they should be designating funds in their budgets to improve both safety and emergency
management as well as cybersecurity (Silverman, 2018). As the industry expands delivery of
care to more digital platforms, healthcare organizations need to make a more concerted effort to
secure patient privacy and ensure safe provision of care.
Future Research & Conclusions
With the increased trend in attack occurrence, there seems to be an increase in the
number of articles related to this topic. A systematic review published in 2016 included 19
articles from 2008 and 2015, whereas a systematic review published in 2017 included 31
articles the majority of which were published in 2016. However, many of these articles are still
news articles rather than academic articles. There is literature related to cybersecurity issues in
information technology literature as well as some literature within cyber insurance literature.
Both of these literature categories fail to focus on what the disaster recovery cycle at an
organizational looks like during cyberattacks or how this threat compares to other threats
against healthcare.
This research project served as an exploratory study in to the new and emerging field of
cyber threats against healthcare organizations. The studies within this project focused on
providing novel data related to the trends, impacts, response, mitigation, and preparation
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specifically related to malware attacks against healthcare at the organizational level. The data
collected in this project provided a descriptive overview of the topic, but future research is
needed on the topic to fully define the risk cyber threats are to the healthcare industry.
A more systematic approach to collecting attack data is necessary to complete a
thorough risk assessment for the healthcare industry. As recommended above, a public data
depository for cyberattacks, similar to the Department of Health and Human Services Data
Breath Portal, would be an excellent answer for healthcare providers. This would allow any
individual in the healthcare field to access data and make determinations on their organization’s
risk based on certain characteristics such as size of facility and geographic location. This
database would also house information regarding the impact of each attach, similar to the
DHHS database displaying number of individuals impacted. One suggestion on how to
accomplish this is a federal regulation similar to the DHHS requirement for providers to report
data breaches to the Office for Civil Rights. While this rule leaves reporting ultimately up to the
provider to determine whether a breach occurred, due to HIPAA laws and the potential for
liability it seems many providers do report. A ruling to develop a reporting requirement would be
a push for healthcare providers to make more information on cyberattacks public. Again, this
information could be used by healthcare organizations to complete a more accurate risk
assessment.
Another future area key to public health research is more evidence-based projects
looking at the effects of cyberattacks on patient safety. There is a lot of speculation on potential
and determination from previous attacks that patient safety was put at risk, but there are not
studies who look at this from a research perspective. Other research could be completed
looking at what else within a hospital could be potentially impacted by cyberattacks. This study
showed an example of an HVAC system and a security system being impacted, but what other
environmental control or safety systems are on a network that could be impacted. There is talk
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within the healthcare community that elevators have been hacked in to and stopped, but this is
not in the research literature. Quantitative research studies would be key to giving hospital
stakeholders the data they need to convince administrators to make system security and
preparedness improvements.
Equally important to having data to convince decision makers to act, is understanding
the difference of perspectives across departments. A few perspective differences were noted
within interviews of Study 2 between the stakeholder departments. These differences were
meant to be explored as part of the original objective of Study 3; however the IT group declined
to participate and therefore the sample size was not large enough for comparison. This is a
research area that is important to examine as knowledge of these differences could be used to
get all stakeholders across the organization to agree on best approaches for improved
preparedness.
Cyber threats to healthcare are not going to dissipate any time in the near future. A
publication from the American Public Health Association estimates over the next five years
cyberattacks will cost our nation’s healthcare system $305 billion in revenue and will affect 1 in
every 13 patients (Krisberg, 2017). Hospitals are a major part to our nation’s response network
and they are tasked with serving their communities (Barnett et al., 2013). During emergencies,
hospitals must be able to safely care for patients on hand as well as handle a surge coming
from within their community. Data collected in this research project shows cyberattacks are
unlike any hazard or emergency the healthcare industry has faced to date. The impacts of this
type of event have the ability to completely shut down an organizations digital network. These
events can also last much longer than normal healthcare emergency situations. Healthcare
organizations need to expand their emergency operating procedures to include cyberattack.
Many of the participants in this study identified the need for healthcare organizations to develop
a supplementary plan for cyber threats due to their variance from the all-hazards response and
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recovery. Data reports show that despite a clear threat to healthcare and patient safety, the
health sector remains vulnerable to attack (Kruse et al., 2017). It is imperative that healthcare
organizations heed this call to action to better prepare their organizations to handle this new
hazard to ensuring their ability to provide access to safe patient care.
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